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DEMOCRACY, CHOICE, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
VOICE IN CONTEMPORARY MEDIA
Blake D. Morant*

INTRODUCTION

A robust press in a democratic society remains a philosophical truism.1 But what does "robust" truly mean when applied to contemporary media? Judging from most commentary, the term primarily
refers to the industry's right to expressive freedom and the deference
afforded that right.2 This interpretation of autonomy reflects a nor* Professor of Law and Director of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee
University School of Law. I extend heartfelt appreciation to Professor Michele Goodwin and
editorial board members of the DePaulLaw Review for the kind invitation to present my work
in the 2003 Symposium, Race as Proxy in Law and Society: Emerging Issues in Race and the
Law. That invitation, and the spirited discussion during the Symposium, contributed immeasurably to this Article. I also wish to express my appreciation to my industrious research assistant,
Mr. Joseph Dunn, Washington and Lee School of Law ('05), and Mrs. Terry Evans, who provided vital administrative support. Last, but certainly not least, I thank my very supportive
spouse, Mrs. Paulette J. Morant, whose comments and patience contributed immeasurably to the
completion of this project.
1. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Thus we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."); William
Penner, Note, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: Upsetting the First Amendment Scales, 26 U.S.F. L.
REV. 753, 780 (1992) (opining that cases involving media restrictions require the consideration of
values in light of the public's interest in an open and robust press); Jay Framson, Notes and
Comments, The First Cut Is the Deepest, but the Second May Be Actionable: Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc. and the Incremental Harm Doctrine, 25 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1483, 1525
n.282 (1992) (noting that when assessing plaintiff's defamation claims, society's interest in a free
and robust press is stronger than an individual's interest in redressing a trivial injury to his or her
dignity); Mark A. Byrd, Comment, Quotations and Actual Malice: Bridging the Gap Between
Fact and Fiction, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 617, 620-21 (1990) (noting that courts have adopted more
relaxed defenses to defamation suits, such as a showing of a statement's substantial truth, in
recognizing of the value of a free and robust press, and in an effort to prevent media self-censorship); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Note, Curtailment of Early Election Predictions: Can We Predict the
Outcome?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 489, 496 (1984) (stating that a robust press also promotes free and
open discussion).
2. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 938
(2002) (arguing that press freedom provides the press with an "unimpeded, uncensored, opportunity to perform its constitutionally based role: being an independent source of information
and vision"); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REV. 429, 483 (2002) (opining that the tradition of expressive freedom is founded on independence from government, political parties, and advertisers, as well as journalistic integrity); Garfield, supra note 1. at 496
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mative conceptualization of unrestricted behavior. 3 Such an unduly

simplistic interpretation of autonomy, however, diminishes media's essentiality as a guarantor of democracy. If media functions to secure
democratic processes, then its robust nature must include both the
sacrosanct right to expressive freedom and the duty to report the variety of viewpoints and perspectives that appeal to a diverse society.
This modest Article, which only commences the discussion of this
rich topic, 4 advances a more expansive view of robustness as it relates

to the functionality of the media within an increasingly diverse society. 5 I posit that genuine autonomy and media's legitimacy hinge not
only upon its freedom to disseminate, but also on the duty to exercise
that right in a manner that incorporates the diversity of individualized
perspectives. Viewpoint diversity summarily defines multiplicity of
voice 6 and must become a prevalent factor in media's decisions to dis-

(noting that because free speech is considered a preeminent right under democratic theory,
courts have rarely allowed the abridgment of the First Amendment in furtherance of governmental interests).
3. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1926 (2000) (arguing that the Free Press Principle demands the
promotion of a robust, autonomous mass media).
4. To explore fully the omnipresent tension between individual expressive rights and the societal need for expansive discourse would consume the space that the DePaul Law Review has
dedicated to this Symposium. I, therefore, consider my Article the first in what I hope will be a
series of scholarly pieces that examine the critical issue.
5. I employ the term "diverse" to connote both ethnicity and viewpoint. Of course, this Article had its genesis through the invitation of this Symposium, which focuses on race as proxy.
Commensurately, diversity incorporates race and ethnicity. The ever-increasing number of diverse individuals in society certainly underscores the timeliness of this Symposium. However,
diversity, when discussed in the context of a responsible free press, is not confined to race and
ethnicity. It also applies to viewpoint. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY
QUICKFACrS (2000) available at http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2004) (reporting that 24.9% of Americans responding to the 2000 decennial census
listed an ethnicity other than "White only"). Compare this with U.S. Census Bureau statistics
for the 1990 decennial census, reporting that only 19.7% of respondents listed an ethnicity other
than "White only." See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES - RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN:
1790 TO 1990, available at http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab0l.pdf
(last visited Apr. 18, 2004). See Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of
ImmigrantAmerica, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 454 (2002) (noting that the growth of diversity in
the United States, now at an all-time high, is a concept that has defined this country since its
founding); cf Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A
Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 138 (1997) (arguing that in the justice system,
traditional notions of subjective standards, such as intent, are no longer applicable in light of the
increasing diversity of the body of peoples to which they apply). Kim opines that as a result of
this changing societal structure, the legal rules designed to promote fairness must also adapt to
changing societal needs. Id. at 138.
6. For a more detailed explanation of multiplicity of voice, see infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
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seminate news and information. 7 This Article advocates the continuation of the government's media ownership rules, which generally
foster multiplicity's objective of robust discourse.
Part II of the Article commences with a discussion of media's function in a democracy. "Democracy" remains a relatively abstract concept that is essential to any discussion of media's role in a diverse
society. Part II explains the various theories of democracy, commencing with the libertarian, autonomy-based norm that contributes to media's drive to inform, educate, and maximize wealth. It then contrasts
strict autonomy theory with civic republicanism, which deemphasizes
autonomy to ensure a more balanced debate. Part II then explains my
preference for a theory of democracy that emphasizes mutual respect
for the autonomous rights of others. This respect-model of autonomy
incorporates multiplicity as a factor in media's decision to report
information.
Part III of the Article describes the governmental influences on media's embrace of multiplicity. It briefly examines judicial decision
making that, over time, has limited governmental efforts that foster
multiplicity through programs that set aside procurements to minorities or traditionally marginalized groups. The focus then shifts to
race-neutral tactics that ensure broader ownership and control of media sources. Central to this discussion are the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) rules that limit ownership of media sources-a
tactic that, despite its nexus with multiplicity, may be weakened by the
agency's controversial decision to relax those rules. Part III then rebuts the FCC's rationale for relaxation of those rules with a revisionist
view of scarcity. Instead of a blanket aggregate of total media
sources, the definition of scarcity, as it pertains to the utility of ownership restrictions, should reflect only those sources from which the majority of individuals receive news and information.
Media's continued utility depends upon the industry's conscientious
and deliberate attempts to report information that responds to the
needs of increasingly diverse constituencies. Such thoughtful decision
making, which multiplicity of voice advances, ensures a robust debate
7. Certainly examination of the media within the context of this Symposium that focuses on
race as proxy is appropriate. Media has had a fundamental if not catalytic influence on society's
discussion of race, ethnicity, and gender. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (providing
details of coverage of the O.J. Simpson arrest and trial as an example of media impact on discussion of racial issues). While multiplicity often encompasses racial and gender viewpoints, it is
not confined to those issues. It is a broad construct that includes a variety of perspectives on an
array of issues. For more regarding multiplicity and its parameters, see infra notes 77-87 and
accompanying text.
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of critical issues and enhances media's function as a monitor of democracy's functionality.
II.

MEDIA'S FUNCTION WITHIN A DEMOCRACY

A critique of media should commence with an examination of the

industry's role within a democratic society. 8 Perhaps media's most
utilitarian function is its tendency to inform on matters of societal import. 9 The motivation to inform the public ideally leads to dissemination of information about the government and, theoretically,
preserves democracy. The informative function, which is virtually tan-

tamount to a duty, has prompted many to refer to the industry as the
"Fourth Estate." 10 Appreciation of this duty, however, requires some
8. See C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 318 (1998)
(positing that one can determine if a free press serves its function only when one determines the
type of free press each form of democracy requires and why it requires that type).

9. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 73 (2002) [hereinafter BAKER,
MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY] (noting media functions to "educate, inform political participation, foment and energize civic and political participation, [and] provide a forum for public
debate and dialogue"); Philip L. Judy, Comment, The First Amendment Watchdog Has a Flea
Problem, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 541, 562 (1997) (noting that the Court's failure to demand the press
report fully and accurately contravenes the media's function of fostering an informed populace);
Michael D. Steger, Slicing the Gordian Knot: A Proposal To Reform Military Regulation of
Media Coverage of Combat Operations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 957, 993 (1994) (noting the Court's
recognition of the media's function in informing the public); Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free
Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 913 (1991) (noting the Court's holding that the
media's function to inform is a compelling interest that satisfies strict scrutiny). For commentary
relevant to the ability of the press to educate the public through coverage of criminal proceedings, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1976). See also Susan E.
Harding, Note, Cameras and the Need for Unrestricted ElectronicMedia Access to FederalCourtrooms, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 827, 846-47 (1996); Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising
the JudicialBranch: In Furtheranceof the Public's First Amendment Rights, 69 S.CAL. L. REV.
1519, 1540-41 (1996); Dolores K. Sloviter, If Courts Are Open, Must Cameras Follow?, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 873, 877 (1998); Nadine Strossen, Free Press and FairTrial: Implicationsof the O.J.
Simpson Case, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 654 (1995). For more regarding media's monitoring
function, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and
What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 231 (1998) (recognizing that media
"help[s] citizens monitor the performance of the official branches of government" and, thus,
becomes the "Fourth Estate of government" (footnote omitted); Vincent Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 562 (espousing the press as
a monitor of government, thereby allowing members of the body politic to pursue private goals
and objectives).
10. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on
the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 965 (2003) (arguing that the "Fourth Estate" serves as
the best watchdog on a national level where it is more attuned to civil rights); Christopher S.
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO.
L.J. 245, 333-34 (2003) (arguing that the media's independence from the government is critical to
the performance of a check on governmental abuse in their role as the "Fourth Estate");
Jonathan W. Lubell, The ConstitutionalChallenge to Democracy and the FirstAmendment Posed
by the Present Structure and Operation of the Media Industry Under the Telecommunications
Acts, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 11, 44 (2003) (stating that reference to the media as the
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conceptualization of the democracy that media fosters."
A.

Autonomy-Based Theories of Democracy and Their
Motivational Influences

A true democracy conjures images of a society in which each member enjoys an equal right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."'1 2 Aristotelian principles, which have probative relevance to

modern conceptualizations of democracy, emphasize equality and justice in terms of the just application of legal principles and the "moral"
training of citizens who adopt a habit-forming behavior of law abidance. 13 Liberty becomes synonymous with autonomy and, thus, in"Fourth Estate" reflects the "role of the First Amendment and its critical contribution to the
people's self-governance").
11. See BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 129-53. The author
comments on several forms of democracy and media requirements of each. An elitist democracy
does not require a press that provides for, or promotes, society's political involvement, but only
one that performs the watchdog, or "checking function." Id. at 133. A liberal-pluralist form of
democracy requires a press that facilitates the democratic bargaining process between the governors and the governed by providing individuals and organized groups with information pertinent
to their respective interests and helping to motivate people to promote those interests. Id. at
138, 148. A republican form of democracy requires a press that facilitates "the process of deliberating about and choosing values and conceptions of the common good"; one that is thoughtfully discursive, yet inclusive. Id. at 143, 148. Finally, a complex form of democracy requires
media that assist groups in recognizing when their interests are at stake, search for "general
societal agreement on 'common goods,"' and "pursue their own separate vision." Id. at 149. For
more on various forms of democracy and their respective media requirements, see generally
Baker, supra note 8.
12. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 716 (2001) (noting
that Aristotle's concept of democracy was one in which all citizens are "to rule and be ruled in
turn") (citation omitted). The author posits that representative governments developed by the
Western cultures owe nothing to this early form of democracy, but instead, can be seen as a form
of mixed government. Id. at 718-21. See Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in
Japan: A Story of New Wine in Old Wine Skins?, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 127, 150-51 (1994)
(noting that the Western concept of democracy, based on an electoral system in which the people
can elect and periodically remove the leaders, creates an environment conducive to the notion of
the rights of the individual and a balance of power between the government and the governed);
see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (opining that
under a democracy, even fundamental rights (such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness)
may be restricted to protect a state from destruction, or serious political, economical, or moral
injury).
13. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415, 44344, 452 (2003) (noting that Aristotle's definition of democracy shows that freedom and equality
are inherent principles upon which a government where the poor are more powerful than the
rich may be founded); Eugene Garver, Why Should Anybody Listen? The Rhetoric of Religious
Argument in Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 378-79 (2001) (noting the necessity, in
an Aristotelian democracy, for the citizens to know each other's characters in order to distribute
offices based on merit); Rubin, supra note 12, at 716 (defining an Aristotelian democracy as one
in which all citizens are "to rule and be ruled in turn"); Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75321), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928), 5 MICH. J.RACE & L. 363, 374 (1999) (noting
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cludes expressive freedom, 14 which is a cornerstone of democracy.
Freedom of speech and press theoretically leads to an informed and
educated citizenry that seeks to maximize individual goals and

desires. 15 This libertarian notion constitutes a fundamental, normative construct of a democracy. 16 The societal significance of expressive autonomy as a core right of individuals bodes for minimal
governmental restriction-a linchpin concept in the negative theory of
free speech.'

7

that what makes an Aristotelian democracy work is equality among citizens who "hold diverse
perspectives, and whose relationships are governed by freedom and rules of civil discourse");
Martin D. Carcieri, OperationalNeed, Political Reality, and Liberal Democracy: Two Suggested
Amendments to Proposition 209-Based Reforms, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 459, 493 n.133
(1999) (noting Aristotle's statement that "while the goal of democracy is liberty, its conception
of justice is equality"); Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and
Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 173 (1998) (noting Aristotle's recognition of the importance of personal character and, consequently, the upbringing of citizens).
14. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees, inter alia, freedom of expression and reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Press," as the Constitution states, constitutes a relatively generic term
that encompasses a variety of media forms, including print and broadcast. Of course, media are
not fungible, with each medium of communication constituting a "law into itself." See Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). Secondly, the First Amendment paradigm applies differently to
various forms of media. See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
15. See WOLFGANG VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE: His POLITICAL
ARGUMENT 81, 82 (1985) (noting Aristotle's view that democracy includes the "moral training
and habit-formation for the development of a citizen's sense of law-abidance and for a just application of the principle of equality" and "character formation," which leads to an "equalisation of
desires").
16. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 200 (1996) (recognizing the value of autonomy as a fundamental value of the

First Amendment, with freedom of expression as a furtherance of the individual will). Other
scholars provide insight into the bounds of libertarianism as it applies to free expression. Summarily stated, libertarianism assumes an absolutist view, which, as Professor Harry Kalven, Jr.
writes, requires that speech must be protected "for everyone, [or] we will have it for none." See
Victor C. Romero, Restricting Hate Speech Against "Private Figures": Lessons in Power-Based
Censorship from Defamation Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001); but see LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA 57 (1986) (opining that libertarian's weakness is the protection it affords those who
seek to destroy the "values of free speech of others"); see also Richard Epstein, Property, Speech
and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 71-75 (1992). For distinctions between libertarian and democratic theories of speech, see OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3

(1996).
17. Justice Stephen Breyer, during an address at the New York University Law School, recently commented on the bounds of this libertarian notion of free speech. Justice Breyer posits

that the Constitution seeks a democratic government as well as the individual's negative freedom
from governmental restraint. He believes that when facing questions of constitutional concern,
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Libertarian or autonomy-based theories, which seemingly dominate
the jurisprudential landscape, have influenced the motivational behavior of contemporary media sources. One ancillary effect of expressive

autonomy includes the industry's tendency to influence public thought
and behavior. 18 While it is debatable whether news reports and edito-

rial commentary can actually change attitudes, there is historical proof
that media acts subtly to influence public behavior.
In his political pamphlet, Common Sense, Thomas Paine urged the
fledgling colonies of America to revolt against England. 19 Paine failed

to convert the Tories, but crystallized the resentment of many colonists who adopted a revolutionary ideology. There were, of course,
more modern examples of media's subtle impact on events. William
Randolph Hearst's New York Journal argued for war against Spain in
the Court should heed this underlying purpose of the Constitution and promote an active and
constant participation in collective power. See generally Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002).
18. See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, and the Business
Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 819, 893-94 (2003) (noting the effects of media's projection
of stereotypes on children, namely their shaping of those children's perceptions of people of
color, which are carried through to adulthood); Paul A. LeBel, Misdirecting Myths: The Legal
and Cultural Significance of DistortedHistory in PopularMedia, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035,
1036-37 (2002) (noting the potentially detrimental effects of broadcast and published works of
fiction on the viewer, namely cases in which the viewer has been incited to carry out violent
acts); Michael L. Landsman, The European Community's Television Quota Reappraised, 8 MEDIA L. & POL'y 29, 32 (1999) (citing the Third Reich's use of the mass media as an example of
the potential for using the power of media to influence thought and behavior). The author
quotes Hitler as saying that "he could never have conquered Germany without the loudspeaker." Id.
19. See generally THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in 2 THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS

PAINE 97 (William M. Van der Weyde ed., 1925). See also David Ray Papke, Law, Cinema, and
Ideology: Hollywood Legal Films of the 1950's, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1482 (2001) (citing
Thomas Paine as saying, in Common Sense, that in America the law could be king); Paul Schiff
Berman, An Observation and a Strange but True "Tale": What Might the Historical Trials of
Animals Tell Us About the Transformative Potential of Law in American Culture?, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 123, 133 (2000) (citing Thomas Paine, in Common Sense, as suggesting that in order to fill
the gap left by overthrowing the monarch, the American people could draft a legal charter, place
it on top of the Bible, and then place a crown on the charter); Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to
Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 n.3 (1993)
(quoting THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS
3, 32 (Nelson F. Adkins ed., 1953)) ("But where, says some, is the King of America? I'll tell you,
friend, he reigns above, and does not make havoc of mankind like the royal brute of Britain ....
[I]n America the law is king. For as in absolute governments, the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other."); Helen K. Michael, The Role of
Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders ContemplateJudicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" IndividualRights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 446-47 (1991) (citing the democratic theory of natural law as that which inspired Thomas Paine's call to arms in Common
Sense); Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference That Is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudenceof Judicial
Deference to the Military, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1009, 1030 n.96 (1990) (citing Thomas Paine as saying,
in Common Sense: "Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression" and "[w]e have it in
our power to begin the world over again").

950
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1898. While no one would say that Hearst's publication sparked the
movement toward war, it undoubtedly contributed to a climate of war
20

fever.
More recent and dramatic examples of media's influence were reports of Trent Lott's statements during the centennial birthday cele21
bration of retired Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina.
Many opined that these reports sparked intense public discourse that
contributed substantially to Lott's resignation as Republican Majority
22
Leader in the House.

20. See BEN PROCTOR, WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST: THE EARLY YEARS, 1863-1910, at 11534 (1998) (describing how Mr. Hearst deployed his formidable media assets to advance causes
that he deemed just, including the Spanish-American War of 1898); Lubell, supra note 10, at 2831 (citing William Randolph Hearst and his New York Journal as illustrating the most skillful
utilization of "yellow journalism's" power, that is the power to both maximize profits and fulfill a
political agenda). The author notes Hearst's desire for a war with Spain, and the subsequent
publication by his New York Journal of a stolen private letter from Spanish Minister Dupuy de
Lome, in which de Lome ridiculed President William McKinley as "weak and catering to the
rabble, and besides, a low politician." Id. at 31. See also Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing
InternationalLaw: The Comparativeand HistoricalContext, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 458 (2002)
(citing William Randolph Hearst as propelling the United States into war with Spain); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 875 n.408 (noting historians' general acknowledgment that "screaming headlines and inaccurate, one-sided stories in Hearst's
newspapers fanned public sentiment against Spain and greatly contributed to bringing about the
Spanish-American War"); Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a
Changing Environment, 14 AM. U. Ir'L L. REV. 83, 97 (1998) (noting Hearst's use of newspaper
accounts of Spanish atrocities in Cuba to incite dislike for Spain).
21. See Thomas B. Edsall, Lott Decried for Part of Salute to Thurmond; GOP Senate Leader
Hails Colleague's Run as Segregationist,WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2002, at A6 (noting the criticism
surrounding Senator Lott's statement that the United States would have been better off if thensegregationist candidate Strom Thurmond had won the presidency in 1948); Kenneth R. Bazinet,
Jesse Wants Lott Cast Out for Dixiecrat Dig, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Dec. 9, 2002, at 8 (noting Reverend Jesse Jackson's calling for Senator Lott to resign as GOP leader after his remarks regarding
Strom Thurmond).
22. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Elisabeth Bumiller, In a Rare PoliticalMoment, Powell Criticizes Sen. Lott; Meanwhile, Sen. Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island Becomes the First Republican
Senator to Publicly Call for Trent Lott's Resignation, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 19, 2002, at A3
(noting Senator Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island as the first Republican senator to publicly call
for Lott's outright resignation); Mary Leonard, Conservatives Say Lott Hurts Agenda They're
Contending He Should Resign for Their Programs To Advance, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2002,
at A3 (noting conservatives' fear that the firestorm engulfing Senate GOP leader Trent Lott has
"jeopardized prospects for welfare reform, school vouchers, expanding federal grants to religious
charities, and confirming conservative judges"); Stephen Dinan, Lott Resigns Senate Leadership
Post; Will Retain His Seat; FristSet To Succeed Him, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at Al (noting
Senator Lott resignation as Senate Republican leader as a result to pressure over the raciallycharged comments he made regarding Strom Thurmond); Vincent Morris, Spent Trent Quits
GOP Helm: Will Remain in Senate as FristWaits in Wings, N.Y. POST, Dec. 21, 2002, at 5 (noting
the pressure Senator Lott received from Republican allies, forcing him to resign his leadership
post).
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Full and fair reporting has legitimacy beyond its tendency to expose
wrongs or influence behavior. It also correlates to media's ethical re23
sponsibility to provide complete information for a diverse populace.
Fulfillment of this equitable duty would presuppose the inclusion of

multiple viewpoints on issues of societal importance.
Profit, however, arguably constitutes the most dominant manifestation of autonomy, and media's most potent motivator. 24 Virtually
every media concern, whether it is broadcast or print, has a consuming
goal to maximize pecuniary gain. 25 The need for profit fuels the quest
23. See generally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that the press
has a responsibility to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government and public
records and cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information.); see Edward J. Pauw &
Ari Chaim Shapiro, Comment, Defamation, The Free Press, and Latin America: A Roadmap for
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Emerging Democracies, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 203, 205 (1998) (arguing that the media has the generally recognized right to publish
truthful information, as well as the generally recognized duty to report accurately and refrain
from defamation); Judy, supra note 9, at 545 (noting the Court's tradition of stating that the
media should report fully and accurately, but not demanding it). Various news organizations and
many voluntary associations for journalists have endorsed ethical codes designed, inter alia, to
seek the truth and ensure accuracy and fairness in reports of news events. For example, see
GANNETr NEWSPAPER Div., PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR NEWSROOMS, available at

http://www.gannett.com/job/jobs/principles.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2004); ASSOCIATED PRESS
MANAGING EDITORS, APME CODE OF ETHICS REVISED AND ADOPTED 1995, available at http://
www.apme.com/about/codeethics.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2004); RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS
DIRECTORS ASS'N & FOUND., CODE OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, available at,

www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2004); AM. SOC'Y OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS,
ASNE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=888 (last visited, Apr. 1, 2004); E.W. SCRIPPS CO., STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT, available at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=395 (last visited, Apr. 1, 2004); and
the SOC'v OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS, available at http://www.spj.org/ethicsscode.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2004), which, roughly summarized, implore journalists to: seek
the truth and report it; minimize harm to victims and similarly situated third parties; act independently to avoid conflicts of interest; and remain accountable to readers or viewers. For more on
the journalists' code of ethics, see generally JAY BLACK, ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM
(3d ed. 1999); see also Lou Hodges, Rationalefor the Proposed Code, and Other Concerns, CHICAGO HEADLINE CLUB, at http://www.headlineclub.org/forum/ethics/rationale.html
(Mar. 14,

2002) (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).
24. See Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1627, 1644 (1999) (noting that media owners will occasionally, in the pursuit of profitmaximization, endorse political candidates in exchange for political favors). Advertisers, because of the financial support they provide for media, often exert great influence over programming content. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 45-69
(1994) (analyzing the influence of advertisers over programming content).
25. See Elizabeth Thoman, Screen-Agers . . . and the Decline of the "Wasteland", 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 601, 606 (2003) (noting that most media messages are constructed to gain profit or

power); Rick S. Lear & Jefferson D. Reynolds, Your Social Security Number or Your Life: Disclosure of Personal Identification Information by Military Personnel and the Compromise of Privacy and National Security, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 23 (2003) (describing the media as a largely
profit-motivated industry that is not self-regulated); James E. Michel, Student Article, Embarking On Its Most Extensive Review of Media Ownership: The FCC's Endeavor to Create a Happy
Medium, 15 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 249, 272 (2003) (noting that as major networks grow, their
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for larger audiences. 26 Profit maximization seems to overshadow media's ethical duty to disseminate fully information about important societal matters.2 7 Indeed, the drive for audience often encourages

feeding frenzy, which can significantly distort news reports. 28

need to maximize profits to compete with other media giants often surpasses their obligation to
offer fair and complete programming); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46-47 (2002)
(noting that the prevalence of news content regarding corporate fraud is furthered by the media's profit incentive to attract more viewers and those viewers' viewing preferences); C. Edwin
Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up On Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 871 (2002) (arguing that when government policymakers recommend less intervention and regulation, they give
in to the film industry's search for higher profit levels and create a viewing environment less
likely to sympathize with diverse social issues); Susan Harris, Open Hearings: A Questionable
Solution, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 673, 678 (2000) (describing the perspective of those advocates for closed hearings in juvenile protection cases as driven by the fear of the media's profit
motive and trend of only covering cases that serve a prurient public interest, which bear the risk
of causing emotional harm to the child); Hasen, supra note 24, at 1631 (describing media owners
as profit- or influence-maximizers who use their news outlets to endorse their own interests and
secure access to public officials); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of
Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 874 (2002) (noting that sensational stories, and the accompanying profit levels, provide incentive for news groups to disclose potentially embarrassing private facts about public officials).
26. See Kelly L. Cripe, Comment, Empowering the Audience: Television's Role in the Diminishing Respect for the American JudicialSystem, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235, 250 (1999) (noting
that as ratings climb, so do profits, and the incentive to cover high-profile trials from "gavel to
gavel"); Lidsky, supra note 9, at 218 (arguing that news shows can afford to use questionable
newsgathering techniques because of the higher profits associated with the higher ratings they
seek); David A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges, Juries,and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83 IOWA L. REV. 161, 161-62 (1997) (arguing that undercover reporting by "newsmagazine"
shows, which raise serious issues of journalistic ethics, have proliferated due to increasing ratings
and thus profits); Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution and the Need for Disclosure: A
Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 81 (1994) (noting the
coloring of classic black-and-white films leads to a larger market-share rating and thus profits).
27. See infra notes 77-87 (discussing the concept of multiplicity of voice).
28. See Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It
Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 263, 286-87 (2002) (asking
whether media frenzy has prompted more persons to gather fame through becoming a witness,
possibly leading to a skewed version of their testimony due to constant media exposure); Marc
Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 717, 717 (1998) (arguing that distorted, sensationalized stories resulting from media
frenzy lead to a perception of the civil justice system which perpetuates frivolous lawsuits); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of
Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 793 (1997) (positing that the behavior of attorneys in the
O.J. Simpson case was influenced by the media frenzy, namely the ever-present cameras in the
courtroom); Jonathan M. Remshak, Comment, Truth, Justice, and the Media: An Analysis of the
Public Criminal Trial, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1083, 1116 (1996) (noting that federal court
proceedings have not been subject to the same type of media frenzy that state court proceedings
have been, mostly due to the inadmissibility of cameras into the courtroom, thus affording
greater protection to the defendant's right to a fair trial); Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justifiable or
UnwarrantedInvasion of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual
Orientation, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857, 878 (1993) (opining that the media frenzy
spawned by a political candidate's alleged sexual indiscretions leads to an inadequate coverage
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Perhaps the most notorious example of media frenzy was coverage
of the O.J. Simpson arrest and trial for the murder of Nicole Brown
Simpson, his estranged wife.2 9 Time magazine published on its cover
3
an obscure and darkened picture of a recently arrested Simpson. 0
Some believed that the Time publication of a more sinister-looking
Simpson inflamed racial animus. 31 Moreover, distorted and seemingly
unending coverage of sensational events, such as the Simpson trial,
undoubtedly resulted from media's zeal to capture a huge audience. 32
Other manifestations of the quest for ratings are sensational programs such as reality and tabloid-like shows. Professor Cass R. Sunstein believes that media's ravenous quest for gain, fueled by rampant
autonomy, has contributed to the increase in sensational programming. 33 The proliferation of this type of programming lends credence
of the more significant issues facing the electorate). The author argues: "Under these circumstances, the press fails miserably in its appointed function." Id.
29. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995); Blake D. Morant,
Resolving the Dilemma of the Televised Fair Trial: Social Facilitationand the Intuitive Effects of
Television, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 329 (2001); see also GILBERT GElS & LEIGH B. BIENEN,
CRIMES OF THE CENTURY: FROM LEOPOLD AND LOEB TO O.J. SIMPSON 104 (1998) (noting that

direct telegraph lines and special teletype machines connected reporters covering the trial to
Berlin, Paris, Melbourne, and Buenos Aires); Ralph E. Roberts, Jr., An Empiricaland Normative Analysis of the Impact of Televised Courtroom Proceedings,51 SMU L. REV. 621, 622 (1998)
(mentioning the extensive television coverage of the Simpson trial); Peter M. Agulnick, In
Search of Truth: A Case for Expanding Perjury's Recantation Defense, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 353,
354 (1997) (citing the Simpson trial as the most televised trial in history); Christo Lassiter, The
Appearance of Justice: TV or Not TV-That Is the Question, 86 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928,
930 (1996) (commenting on the magnitude of media coverage of, and public interest in, the
criminal proceedings involving O.J. Simpson).
30. See Time's June 27, 1994 cover.
31. See Time Magazine Darkens and Blurs O.J. Simpson Mug Shot, June 21, 1994, 1994 WL
10150984 (noting that Time and Newsweek both used Simpson's mug shot, but that Time had an
artist darken and blur the face, but not, according to a Time spokesperson, in an effort to mislead); see also Peter Arenella, People v. Simpson: Perspective on the Implicationsfor the Criminal Justice System-Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1258 (1996) (arguing that
the darkened Time magazine picture epitomizes how badly our culture deals with race); Edgar
Allen Beem, Byting the Hand That Heeds Them, MAINE TIMES, May 12, 1995, at 16 (referencing
Time's decision to "digitally darken O.J. Simpson's complexion to make him look more
sinister").
32. See Marge Injasoulian & Gregory L. Leisse, Media Crises, 36 CATH. LAW. 97, 106-07
(1995) (noting that the hysteria surrounding the press's quest for sensationalism and, thus, increased readership and viewership, often leads to "inaccurate reporting and incomplete source
verification"); see also Kevin A. Isern, When Is First Amendment Speech No Longer Protected by
the FirstAmendment: A Plaintiffs Perspective of Agricultural Disparagement,10 DEPAUL Bus.
L.J. 233, 256 (1998) (noting the controversy surrounding Oprah Winfrey's dissemination of false
information regarding the safety of beef products in the United States, and her show's purposeful editing and packaging of the false information, including the deletion of scientific rebuttal, in order to increase ratings).
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2269-70
(1998) (noting the economic pressure on media to lean towards sensationalism and, thus, disserve democratic ideals).
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to the argument that the media inflames rather than informs, and incites rather than educates. Indeed, when motivation devolves solely
to profit, media contravenes its ethical responsibility to inform fully
34
and honestly.
Despite its negative byproducts, autonomous behavior in the form
of self-criticism can check the negativity from media frenzy. For example, after Time published the sinister-looking photograph of O.J.
Simpson, other sources reported the outrage of those who thought the
magazine inappropriately inflamed racial attitudes. Time ultimately
acknowledged the error as an unintended consequence. 35 Another
example of a check on media's behavior was the reported outrage expressed over erroneous projections in the 2000 presidential election.
After resounding public criticism, many broadcast sources took unprecedented steps to reform the procedures used to report election
36
returns.
34. See supra note 23 (listing various journalistic ethics codes). One negative by-product of
media's drive for ratings is erroneous projections in elections and the accompanying effect on
the electoral process. See Election 2000: The Role of the Courts, The Role of the Media, The
Roll of the Dice, Conference Report, Northwestern University, Jan. 2001, at 21 (commenting
that the networks' rush to declare a winner in the Bush-Gore contest, and resultant errors in
reporting, were due in large measure to the quest for high ratings).
35. See N.Y. Times News Service, Cover Wasn't Racist, Time Magazine Says, CHI. TRIB., June
25, 1994, §1, at 8 (noting Time's managing editor's posting, on an AOL message board, of a
statement discounting any implied racial bias in the altering of O.J. Simpson's photograph and
stating his regret at any resulting offense to the public). For other newspapers' printing of the
same story, see, Time Magazine 'Regrets' Portraitof O.J. Simpson, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June
24, 1994, at E6, Time Explains Use of Altered Simpson Photo, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1994, at
A13; and Deirdre Carmody, No Racial Bias Intended in Time Cover, EditorSays, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, June 24, 1994, at Cl.

36. See Editorial, Driving Voters Away, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2001, at A22 (editorial aside); Bill
Sammon, Networks' Early Call Kept Many from Polls: Florida Section Affected by TV, WASH.
TIMES, May 7, 2001, at Al; Letters to the Editor, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 2000, at A20 (opining that
the networks' erroneous call of the Florida winner massively affected turnout in the West, and
stymied Republican "get-out-the-vote" efforts in California); Daniel T. Zanoza, Editorial, Remembering Sweetness with Gift of Life, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000 at 48 (arguing that the
major networks' early projections in Florida represented the height of irresponsibility and were
unfair to both Presidential candidates); see also David Foster, West Coast Voters Angry at Early
Call of Presidential Election, Assoc. PRESS ONLINE, Nov. 5, 1996, available at 1996 WL 4447931

(noting the concern by many groups that the networks' early projections of the presidential race
can dissuade potential voters, who have been told their candidate has already lost, from going to
vote at all); Terry Dickson, Let Pelote Prophesy Campaign, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 9, 2001, at
B1 (suggesting an election reform tactic that would forbid the reporting of the results from polls
in the East until those in the West close so as not to dissuade those in the western states from
voting); Ted Van Dyk, Editorial, Election ProposalsAddress Problems, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-

GENCER, Aug. 9, 2001, at B4 (citing the bipartisan commission on election reform proposing that
"no national-election result in any state be projected until polls have closed in all [forty-eight]
contiguous states"); Yochi J. Dreazen, Networks' Coverage of Election Draws Study's Criticism,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2001, at B14 (citing a report written by a panel of three respected journalists
as criticizing the networks' reliance on faulty data and projections from the Voter News Service).
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Yet despite its more ancillary benefits, expressive autonomy's more

dominant manifestation remains the quest for profit. The commensurate quest for audience often consumes decision making to the point
that other more noble motivations, such as multiplicity, become secondary. Conglomerate ownership and profit's pervasive influence on
media behavior compel examination of the industry's responsiveness

to society's diverse constituency.
B. Autonomy's Shortcomings and Alternative Theories
Autonomy-based notions of democracy tend to obscure a funda-

mental fact: Citizens exercise their rights within the collective unit of
a society. 37 As a consequence, libertarian rights of individuals depend

upon the preservation of the collective interests of the society in which
they live. This reality compels a conceptualization of democracy that

extends beyond stark notions of autonomy. 38
Various theories espouse a broader view of democracy. 39 The
deemphasis of individual autonomy in order to maximize universal
participation by members of society constitutes a key concept of civic
republicanism.4 0 Civic republicans focus on the security of democratic
The report blamed the networks for "stag[ing] a collective drag race on the crowded highway of
democracy, recklessly endangering the electoral process, the political life of the country and
their own credibility .. " See generally Joan Konner et al., Television's Performance on Election
Night 2000: A Report for CNN (Jan. 29, 2001), at http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/02/02/cnn.report/cnn.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
37. For more on "society," see infra notes 69 and 70 and accompanying text.
38. See Baker, supra note 8, at 318. Professor C. Edwin Baker, whose profound scholarship in
this area I accord full attribution, provides persuasive commentary regarding the need to define
"free press" in terms of the role or purpose of that freedom within a democratic society. Professor Baker begins this inquiry with a pivotal question that I paraphrased in the text of the Article:
If the Press Clause were designed to ensure democracy, then how should we interpret the
clause? Id. That inquiry, together with my subsequent description of the democracy's features,
provides the theoretical foundation for the discussion of media's appropriate role in society.
39. Professor Baker identifies four theories of democracy: elite (centralized theme of governmental legitimacy); liberal pluralism (characterized by deference to individual equality and autonomy); republican (focuses on the common good and citizens' concern for the welfare of
others); and complex democracy (borrows elements from both the liberal democratic and republican principles, thus noting individuals' searches for common ground and fostering of the common good, while also advancing their own individual or group interests). Id. at 319-39.
40. See Saul Cornell, Moving Beyond the Canon of Traditional ConstitutionalHistory: AntiFederalists,the Bill of Rights, and the Promise of Post-Modern Historiography, 12 LAW & HIST.
REV. 1, 7 (1994) (describing "civic republicanism" as a positive liberty that empowers a community through the fostering of "public good"); see also MICHEAL A. GILLESPIE & MICHAEL
LIENESCH, RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 85 (1989); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in
Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 596-97 (2001) (espousing that civic republicanism
requires present desires to be fluid to accept the ideas from open debate, which should be inclusive of alternate perspectives); W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession:
Social Norms in ProfessionalCommunities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 2001 (2000) (noting republicanism's feature of "interlocking relationships," and the State's neutrality in its conceptualiza-
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processes through a fostering of expressive rights of all members of
society. Thus, each citizen, regardless of socioeconomic status, should
experience meaningful participation in political processes of the body

politic.
To Professor Owen Fiss, the goal of any democracy should be the
preservation of self-governance for all members of society. Collective
self-determination, thus, becomes a central focus of ,democracy and
overshadows individual autonomy. 41 Fiss also posits that the free

market's tendency for unequal wealth distribution leads to a participatory imbalance on matters of public interest. Those of greater
wealth dominate debate, and that domination contributes to a lack of
informed choices in political matters. 42 Thus, autonomy preservation,
which is a staple of the free market, has value only to the extent that it
furthers collective self-governance for all members of society. 43 Fiss
embraces limited governmental regulation of democratic processes

(even when such regulation impacts speech) to promote egalitarian
44
public debate.

tion of the "common good"); William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element
in Statutory Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 629, 638-39 (2001) (noting republicanism's fostering of forum deliberation); Hope M. Babcock, Democracy's Discontent in a Complex World:
Can Avalanches, Sandpiles, and Finches Optimize Michael Sandel's Civic Republican Community?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2091 (1997) (critiquing Michael Sandel's civic republican model, which
envisions a community where citizens work toward common good in a seemingly contrary setting
in which the community exercises control over those citizens).
41. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408-11, 1425
(1986) (noting the occasional need for speech restrictions in an effort to further public
discourse).
42. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987) (arguing against an
overemphasis on autonomy, and noting that such an emphasis leads to the domination of debate
by those who control the economic and political "power structure" in society); see also Fiss,
supra note 41, at 1410.
43. See Fiss, supra note 41, at 1409-10.
44. Id. at 1412; see generally OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996) [hereinafter Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED] (espousing
the need to interpret the First Amendment to accommodate contemporary social change). Fiss
has maintained that media regulation may be necessary to preserve broadcast medium as a public forum. See FIss, supra note 16, at 52-78; Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra, at 154-58. Fiss's
desire of a focal shift from autonomy to more balanced public discourse represents a public
debate approach to First Amendment jurisprudence. See Fiss, supra note 42, at 786 (espousing
that decisionmakers should judge action by the impact on the richness of public debate, rather
than interference with autonomy). Others scholars have more or less echoed this theme. See,
e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); C. Edwin
Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 366-72 (1997); Stephen A.
Gardbaum, Broadcasting,Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 395 (1993); Thomas I.
Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 795-98 (1981).
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Professor Sunstein, like Fiss, embraces civic republicanism to the
extent that it fosters deliberative democracy. 45 Sunstein posits that
democracy depends upon each member of society participating meaningfully in public discourse. 46 Overemphasis of autonomy preserva-

tion skews public debate, 47 fosters sensational journalism, 48 and
contributes to media frenzy. 49 Democracy requires that media maximize participation in public discourse on issues critical to the body
politic. 50 The furtherance of universal participation requires some

measure of governmental regulation, the goal of which is the ultimate
51
diversification of public debate.

Summarily stated, Fiss and Sunstein argue for the deemphasis of
autonomy and a heightened awareness of balanced, meaningful politi-

cal discourse. 52 Such historic and landmark First Amendment cases as

45. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION] (advancing liberal republicanism or deliberative democracy
which requires legislatures to become more activist to protect individual rights); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival] (demonstrating a nexus between republicanism and deliberative
democracy); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups] (advocating that the judiciary utilize republicanism
to evaluate political processes and outcomes).
46. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 45, at 1548-49, 1570 (describing politics as "deliberative," with an emphasis upon "collective debate").
47. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preference and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984)
(noting that deliberative democracy eschews resource distributions based solely on "raw political
power").
48. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
73 (2000) (stating that "many recent observers have embraced the traditional American aspiration to 'deliberative democracy' an ideal that is designed to combine popular responsiveness
with a high degree of reflection and exchange among people with competing views"); see also
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASONS AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William
Rehg eds., 1997); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
128-64 (1996), JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS-

COURSE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287-328 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996).
49. See Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of Self-Restraint,55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (describing media frenzy as the industry's proclivity for the
"schizophrenic-like" coverage of high profile events, and the resultant tendency to sensationalize
or distort news reports); LARRY SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY 6 (1991) (stating that "feeding
frenzy" relates to the press's obsession with more trivial aspects of a public interest matter,
leading the press to focus more on "gossip rather than governance" and "titillation rather than
scrutiny").
50. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at xix, 93 (stating emphatically that "autonomy, guaranteed
as it is by law, may itself be an abridgement of the free speech right ...

[m]y special concern is

that the First Amendment [can be interpreted in such a manner as] to undermine democracy").
51. See id. at 83; cf Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 44 (deemphasizing autonomy with
an eye toward enhancement of the "quality of public debate" and the "informational needs of
the public").
52. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (noting Fiss and Sunstein's embrace of limited interventionism to further more balanced public discourse). For probative commentary regarding civic republicanism so embraced by Fiss and Sunstein, see generally Martin H. Redish &
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New York Times v. Sullivan53 and Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC
54
reflect their civic republican philosophies.
Fiss and Sunstein's brand of civic republicanism has its critics.55 Al-

though I greatly appreciate the Fiss-Sunstein model, I advance a more
essentialist notion of democracy. 56 The theory I embrace comports
Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications,79 CAL. L. REV. 267 (1991); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Post
on Public Discourse Under the First Amendment, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1738, 1741 (1990); Robert
C. Post, The Perils of Conceptualism: A Response to ProfessorFallon, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1744,
1746-47 (1990).
53. 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (stating that the First Amendment safeguard of freedom of expression on public questions "was fashioned to assure unfettered exchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people") (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that Alabama law,
as applied by the lower court, did not sufficiently provide a safeguard against infringement of
freedom of speech and press in a libel action brought by a public official. Id. at 264. The Court
has followed the Sullivan holding in the following cases: Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663, 668 (1991); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991); Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 7 (1990); Hart-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 657, 659 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1988); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 487 (1984); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 156 (1979); Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976);
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local
114, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964).
54. 395 U.S. 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail ....
). The Court ultimately upheld
the Fairness Doctrine, as promulgated by the FCC, as consistent with Congressional purpose and
the enhancement of First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. Id. at 391-92. The Court,
however, has limited this holding to the arena of broadcast television. See Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
55. See Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the
First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003); see also GEORGE A. KEYWORTH II ET AL., THE
TELECOM REVOLUTION: AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY 31-36, 52-68 (1995) (proposing abolition
of FCC); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of
Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2102 (1997); Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the ConstitutionalRole of Self-Interest: The
Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 367 (2001) (critiquing civic republicanism,
which espouses consensus and universalism, yet does not "do away with" or have adequate
mechanisms that address conflict).
56. Feminist theorists have historically defined essentialism as "a belief in true essence-that
which is most irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person or thing."
See DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE 2 (1989); Jane
Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate, in Feminist Legal Theory: The Debate and
Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 274-75 (1999) (noting essentialism as characteristics that are of the essence and, therefore, "unchangeable"); see also Camille A. Nelson,
(En)Raged or (En)Gaged: The Implications of Racial Context to the Canadian ProvocationDefence, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1007, 1067 n.311 (2002); ELIZABETH GROSZ, SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
AND THE PROBLEM OF ESSENTIALISM IN THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE 84 (1994); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-44 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Joan Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87 MICH.

2004]

CONTEMPORARY MEDIA

with that of Professor C. Edwin Baker. Baker firmly believes that
each individual has the right to influence and engage others. 57 Em-

bedded in that right is the respect for the autonomous rights of others.
Consequently, autonomous rights of individuals, regardless of their
socioeconomic status, are equal and without priority. 58 Democracy,
therefore, is legitimate only to the extent that it furthers a reciprocal

59
respect for the expressive autonomy of others.
In my view, democracy should not only secure individual liberties,

but also encourage respect for the autonomous rights of others. This
pluralist, respect-notion of democracy fosters fuller participatory debate since the opinions and views of diverse constituencies are valued
and promoted equally. 60 Encouragement of the respect for the auton-

omous rights of others in tandem with society's collective interest in
full and robust debate on important issues represents a pluralistic
61
form of democracy.
Of course, achievement of a balance between individual and collective interests becomes a formidable challenge given their inherent differences. Expressive autonomy generally trumps collective interests
L. REV. 797 (1989). The term, however, has broader implications, particularly when one attempts to isolate the essence of legal rules or theories. Essentialism in the non-feminist context
includes Ronald Dworkin's definition of characteristics of rights as abstracts defined in constitutional interpretation that includes history, text, and philosophy. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 928-29 (1999).
57. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 [hereinafter

BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY] (1989) (stating that "respect for individual integrity and autonomy
requires the recognition that a person has the right to use speech to develop herself or to influence or interact with others in a manner that corresponds to her values"); BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9.
58. See BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 57, at 48-49; see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
59. Others appear to endorse Baker's dignitary view of autonomy. See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-98, 165-78 (1986) (recognizing the "right to conscience" as a foundational element of the First Amendment, and generally noting the need for

mutual respect for individual voices in a society); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
xxiv-xxvii (1993); see generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980).
60. The theory of democracy I adopt in this Article borrows from Professor Baker's preferred
complex democracy. Individual autonomy and preservation of the common good are interdependent concepts that must be simultaneously fostered in varying measure depending upon context. For a more detailed explanation of complex democracy, see BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS,
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 143-44. The author posits a more realistic theory of "complex democracy" that draws on elements of both liberal pluralist and republican democracy.
"[Ilit assumes that a participatory democracy would and should encompass arenas where both
individuals and groups look for and create common ground, that is, common goods, but where
they also advance their own individual and group values and interests."

Id. at 144.

61. See Baker, supra note 8, at 327-30 (stating that "liberal pluralism" recognizes "intractable
diversity" with conflicting values, ideas, and interests as normative).
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in societal processes such as elections 62 and governmental necessity. 63
Perhaps the Constitution's express provision of individual rights signifies a priority that contributes to this imbalance. 64
Expressive freedom broadly applies to both natural and corporate
persons. 65 This postulate empowers the media to exercise its expres67
sive rights, 66 albeit with some limitation defined by context.

Personal liberties, particularly those related to expression, appear
to trump societal interests. 68 This result has guarded validity given
62. See Morant, supra note 49 (noting the prior restraint doctrine as the most significant example of expressive autonomy's supremacy over electoral integrity concerns).
63. See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights" First
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1958-59 (2003) (offering a "private rights theory"
that balances the government's regulatory interest against a citizen's private expressive autonomy). The author cautions, however, that this theory "gives the Court substantial discretion to
cast expressive interests as trivial in the face of weighty, non-speech regulatory objectives." Id.
at 1958.
64. The Bill of Rights, which includes the First and Sixth Amendments, restricts governmental
action against individuals. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 n.8

(3d ed. 2000); see also infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text (describing expressive liberties in
the United States as inelastic).
65. Media sources, as corporate entities, enjoy expressive freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990)
(finding that corporations, like persons, have the right to free expression under the Constitution); Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739 (1995) (noting expressive liberty as an originally conceived right of human kind, with institutional speech as an
abstraction from that of the individual); see generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and
Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 514 (2001).
66. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 444 (expressing that media of any form, i.e., information,
entertainment, or news, enjoys the right to expressive freedom, with the perennial question being whether rights of broadcast and other media forms are as extensive as those enjoyed by the
press or print media); see also PETE E. KANE, MURDER, COURTS, AND THE PRESS: ISSUES IN
FREE PRESS/FAIR TRIAL 68 (1986) (noting that a recent history of criminal trials has shown that

judges are more aware of express and implicit rights under the First and Sixth Amendments).
67. One context in which media's expressive rights may be tempered is that of a criminal trial.
Access rights in that milieu often depend upon the form of media seeking access, i.e., broadcast
versus print, and the impact on defendant's right to a fair trial. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
539-40 (1965) (noting that different media forms required different scrutiny as decisionmakers
balance media access rights with a defendant's need for due process).
68. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 389 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding unconstitutional
a Washington state statute that restricted the media's ability to perform exit polls to a distance of
no less than 300 feet from a polling place); In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that a local rule forbidding jurors to speak to the press after completion of service
except for good cause was unconstitutional as abridging the press's First Amendment right to
gather news); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237-38 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding the media group
has standing to contest a participant-directed gag order because gag orders abridge the media's
First Amendment right of access to information); see also Morant, supra note 49, at 29 (noting
that the courts have dealt with the clash of expressive rights and electoral integrity by defaulting
to "the protection of individual autonomy, with more minor sanctioning of minimalist measures
that ensure fair elections"); Disa Sim, The Right to Solitude in the United States and Singapore:
A Callfor a FundamentalReordering, 22 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 443, 453 (2002) (arguing that a
"citizen's right to solitude must be balanced against the public's right to know and the media's
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that the Constitution expressly provides for civil liberties but only impliedly recognizes collective societal interests. 6 9 Carte blanche acceptance of this priority remains, however, simplistically myopic in light of
the inherent interdependence of individual and collective interests.
"Society" represents a collective body of individuals who must coalesce to some extent to further individual goals.7 0 Individual liberties
and sustenance of the body politic are symbiotic. Neither can flourish
without the other.7 ' Thus, a true democracy strives to achieve a reasonable and admittedly difficult balance between these sometimes
competing interests. Overemphasis of individual interests can result
in group disparities that stymie participation in public debate by more
marginalized constituencies. 72 Conversely, an agenda focused solely
First Amendment right to gather news"); Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen-Soldiers"or Anonymous Justice:
Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, The FirstAmendment Right of the Media
and the Privacy Right of Jurors,25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 371, 421 (1992) (arguing that "the
First Amendment rights to gather news and publish ought not to be disregarded without searching inquiry and compelling justifications").
69. One of the most highly contested issues involving constitutional liberties is a woman's
right to abortion and the consequent societal interest in the health of both the fetus and the
mother. See generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A
Legislative Due-ProcessAnti-Discrimination Principle That Gives Constitutional Content to the
"Undue Burden" Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S.CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD.211, 233 (2001) (noting that while the Supreme Court has found a personal
liberty interest in a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, "[t]he federal and state governments exercise [their] implied power to protect life through legislative or administrative action,"
and thus protect the collective interest); see A. Michael Lee, State ex rel. Angela M.W. v.
Kruzicki: The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Introduces a Dangerous New Weapon in the Battle
Over "Fetal Rights", 30 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1210-11 (1996) (noting "a woman's express constitutional right to physical liberty," as opposed to her "implied constitutional right to an abortion");
see also infra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing congressional recognition of the need
for deliberative democracy).
70. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the CorporateStructure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities,55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 167 (1988) (noting a society as "a system
of power founded in entrenched divergencies of interest") (quoting ANTHONY GIDDENS, STUD-

IES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 347, 348 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also supra note 37 and accompanying text (arguing that autonomous individuals exercise their
freedoms within the framework of a society).
71. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 35-46, 60-72, 85-86
(1982) (finding, generally, the codependency of individuality (autonomy) and democracy (the
latter pertaining to interests critical to preservation of the body politic)); THOMAS I. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7, 8-11, 14-15 (1966) (noting that
personal autonomy and meaningful participation in democratic processes are core speech values); see generally Steven Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation: Away from
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983) (advancing a more
pluralistic approach that recognizes both personal autonomy and preservation of democratic
processes as mutually essential components).
72. See Larry Catr Backer, The Extra-NationalState: American Confederate Federalism and
the European Union, 7 COLUM. J.EUR. L. 173, 183 (2001) (recognizing that the somewhat natural tendency for personal advancement over other fellow societal members "leads to conflict,
anarchy, and ultimately reduces the possibilities for personal advancement"); LEONARD W.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:943

on collective societal interests may quash individual initiative. 73 A
fully functional and pluralistic democracy continually strives to further
society's interest in robust debate, while simultaneously promoting respect for the expressive rights of all members of that society. This
pluralistic concept is closely related to deliberative democracy, which
focuses on a fully participatory and public discussion of societal is-

sues. 74 Within this theoretical framework, media optimizes its utility
and enhances public debate when the information it disseminates reflects a broad spectrum of viewpoints.
C. Multiplicity's Compatibility with a Respect-Model of Democracy

A theory of democracy in which autonomous individuals are encouraged to respect the expressive rights of others potentially maximizes participation in public discourse. 75 This respect-model of

autonomy captures the very essence of multiplicity, and tacitly reLEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 149 (1999) (stating the Supreme Court's position in

Dennis v. United States that individualized action in preparation for revolution can produce anarchy); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 220 (1995) (opining that unabashed selfregulation can lead to anarchy); but see James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice
Scalia's "Split Personality",16 J.L. & POL. 231, 265 (2000) (noting Hamilton's view that too little
power for government (and its leaders) is as troublesome as too much power, with the former

contributing to anarchy and possibly despotism).
73. See David Campbell, Breach and Penalty as ContractualNorm and ContractualAnomie,
2001 Wis. L. REV.681, 691 (recognizing that communism's collapse during the modern post-war
era was attributable to its limitations as a "shortage economy" incapable of adapting to changing
circumstances); The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, The Life of the Law: Principlesof Logic
and Experience from the United States: The Fairchild Lecture, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1, 5 (finding
that communism's failure's was due, in part, to the public's view of alternatives through print and
broadcast media); Stephen J. Solarz, The Collapse of Communism and the Future of the Korean
Peninsula, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 25, 29 (1995) (noting the demands from members of the
public exposed to ideas communicated by external media sources as reasons for the collapse of
communism in East Germany and Poland); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1754 (1992) (attributing communism's failure to the
states control over production and distribution, and its inability (or unwillingness) to accommodate individual choice).

74. See Congressman Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of Deliberative Democracy in the House and Proposalsfor Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 321, 323-25
(1994). The authors describe a deliberative democracy as "an ideal representative" or republican "form of government that allows the free airing of various opinions and perspectives on
governmental policy through the legislative process (i.e., hearings, debates, and amendments).

Id. at 323. The authors also characterize the elements of deliberation as information, arguments,
and persuasion. Id. at 325 (citing Joseph M. Bessette, Is Congress a Deliberative Body?, in THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THOMAS

P.

O'NEILL, JR., SymposiuM

3, 5

(Dennis Hale ed., 1982)). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 266 (1996) (noting that part of the "defining creed of a
deliberative democracy" is that governmental judgments should dictate regulatory policy only
when "undergirded by sound science").
75. See supra note 74 for sources that describe deliberative democracy.
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the perspectives of the increasingly diquires the media to recognize
76
verse constituency it serves.
Multiplicity consists of the dissemination of information that is reflective of the variant range of views and perspectives of a diverse
constituency. 77 The concept's expansive notion of participatory debate relates naturally to deliberative democracy, which embodies discussion of important political issues by the broadest cross-section of
society. 78 The relationship between deliberative democracy and multiplicity remains one of cause and effect. The furtherance of multiplicity, which embraces ideas that appeal to a diverse audience, fosters
and robust public debate.
deliberative democracy's emphasis on full
79
The two concepts are, thus, interrelated.
Voice is a holistic concept that constitutes a distinct perspective,
among many, on critical societal issues. Society's increasing diversity8 ensures a variety of perspectives, a phenomenon that contributes to multiplicity of voice. Multiplicity compels a heightened
76. For more on the increasing diversity of the United States, see supra note 5.
77. See Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (noting that "it
is not too much to say that the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples"); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 77
(1965) (arguing that the "citizens of the United States will be fit to govern themselves under
their own institutions only if they have faced squarely and fearlessly everything that can be said
in favor of those institutions, everything that can be said against them"); BUSINESS-HIGHER
EDUC. FORUM, INVESTING IN PEOPLE: DEVELOPING ALL OF AMERICA'S TALENT ON CAMPUS

AND IN THE WORKPLACE 29-30 (2002), available at http://www.acenet.edufbookstore/pdf/invest-

ingin-people.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (arguing that students' exposure to diverse perspectives in the college environment enhances their participation in democratic society, including
community involvement, volunteer efforts, politics, and activities that promote racial understanding); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 379 (arguing that the long-term effects of the unequal distribution of power is an unequal exposure of ideas, leading to the stifling of new and more radical
ideas).
78. See supra note 74 for an explanation of deliberative democracy.
79. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed. 1982) (arguing that a representative government ensures a more deliberative democracy); Carlos J. Cuevas, Bankruptcy
Code Section 105(a) Injunctions and State and Local Administrative and Civil Enforcement Proceedings, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 365, 424 (1996) (arguing that a proposed judicial standard

that limits the court's use of its equitable powers to enjoin state or local government proceedings
would ensure democratic deliberation by promoting civic republicanism, public values and the
common good); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts To Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 763, 833 (arguing that when agencies use adjudicatory proceedings to perform generic rulemaking functions,
the courts should apply a hard look doctrine to ensure that a participatory and deliberative
decision-making process has occurred); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471 (1989) (opining that our constitutional structure "ensure[s] a
kind of deliberative democracy" by its hostility towards regulatory "measures that impose burdens or grant benefits merely because of the political power of private groups").
80. See supra note 5 for documentation of increased diversity in the United States.
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sensitivity to the variety of viewpoints and perspectives of societal
members. Although multiplicity relates to content, it does not implicate restrictive means to compel its implementation. The embrace of
multiplicity transforms media into a genuine catalyst for robust debate
on many issues, including those that implicate race, ethnicity, or gender. Voice multiplicity encourages sensitivity to issues that are important to traditionally marginalized groups and heightens awareness of
81
the effects of prejudice and stereotypes.
Multiplicity, however, has a broad connotation that extends beyond
race, ethnicity, and gender. While the concept ensures greater responsiveness to traditionally disadvantaged or marginalized groups, its fundamental objective remains the maximization of viewpoint diversity.
This broader conceptualization transforms multiplicity into a universally accepted norm. Consequently, governmental rules that encourage media's greater adoption of multiplicity8 2 should avoid the
strict scrutiny that the courts systematically apply to remedial pro83
grams predicated on race or ethnicity.
Despite its obvious relevance to full and robust discourse, multiplicity can become an ancillary factor in the decision to disseminate news
and information. In addition to media's motivation for profit,84 the
beliefs and attitudes of decisionmakers within a media source significantly influence the information disseminated by that source. Media
sources often assume the ideological perspectives of either their decisionmakers or corporate sponsors whose behavior is substantially im-

81. See Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by
the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time EntertainmentProgramming,45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 304
(2003) (arguing that most negative stereotypes of people of color are learned through electronic
encounters, i.e., television); Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics,and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court
and the Conservative "Backlash", 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1529 (2003) (arguing that the media's
focus on only the most violent of crimes reinforces racial stereotypes); Ediberto RomAn, Who
Exactly Is Living La Vida Loca?: The Legal and PoliticalConsequences of Latino-Latina Ethnic
and Racial Stereotypes in Film and Other Media, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 37, 40 (2000) (argu-

ing that the use of dominant stereotypes in the media reinforces "a biased and untrue perception
of reality").

82. Governmental rules that further multiplicity generally take the form of either contractual
set-asides for disadvantaged groups or ownership restrictions that prevent monopolization and
control of media sources. For a discussion of the contractual set-asides and the judiciary's intense scrutiny thereof, see infra notes 107-122 and accompanying text. For a more detailed analysis of governmental restrictions on the ownership of certain media sources and the validity of
those restrictions, see infra notes 88-99, 141-163 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (detailing the Court's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis applied to remedial programs that the government uses to remedy discrimination based on race).
84. See supra notes 24-28 (discussing media's obsession with profit).
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pacted by their personal attitudes and beliefs. 85 In light of this strong
and virtually unavoidable consequence, media must conscientiously
and deliberately incorporate multiplicity in its decisions to report
information.
86
Of course, the technological explosion of informational sources
and casual observations of media's coverage of significant news events
may suggest a tacit embrace of multiplicity. 87 Superficial or incidental
inclusion of minority or diverse views does not, however, truly manifest multiplicity. Instead, decisionmakers within media sources must
consciously employ multiplicity as an integral consideration as they
choose news and information to report. In the absence of media's
voluntary incorporation of multiplicity, governmental decisionmakers
should provide market incentives that ensure media's responsiveness
to the informational needs of a diverse constituency.
III.
A.

INFLUENCES ON MEDIA'S

Focus

ON MULTIPLICITY OF VOICE

Governmental Advancement of Multiplicity-The Federal
Communication Commission's Initiatives

The twentieth century development of broadcast media (radio and
television) provided the means to disseminate information quickly
and broadly to a large audience-one that is usually greater than that
for print media. The advent of television and radio has led fewer
Americans to rely on print media for their daily news.88 Given its
85. See GERRY SPENCE, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: FREEING OURSELVES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 245-59 (1998) (defining the voice of the media as representing the owners' social and

political ideals); Ethan Klingsberg, JudicialReview of Access to the Media/New Trends in Access
to the Media-Beyond the Voice and Intended View Conception of Speech: Expanding the First
Amendment Goal of Rich Public Debate To Protect a Multiplicity of Discourses, in RIGHTS OF
ACCESS TO THE MEDIA 177 (Andris Saj6 ed., 1996) (noting the Court's perception of "voice" as
the "source" of a message); see also Lee C. Bollinger, Why There Should Be an Independent
Decennial Commission on the Press, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 22 (positing that the voice of a
nation's media is affected by its social and economic system).
86. See Wally Suphap, Getting It Right Versus Getting it Quick: The Quality-Timeliness Tradeoff in Corporate Disclosure, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 661, 664 (noting that "technological
advances on information flow" have led the SEC to require disclosure of financial information in
a quicker and more accurate fashion); Ted Schneyer, The Future Structure and Regulation of
Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 521, 522 (2002) (noting that technological advances allow the
public to access a vast amount of legal information without the intervention of attorneys); Erik
S. Knutsen, Techno-Neutrality of Freedom of Expression in New Media Beyond the Internet: Solutions for the United States and Canada, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 87, 111-12 (2001) (arguing that
technological advances in media types (e.g., Internet, cable) will soon render the historical problem of scarcity of broadcast frequencies nonexistent).
87. Indeed, during the presentation of this piece during the DePaul Law Review Symposium,
a participant opined that media's reporting of events are, at present, exceedingly diverse.
88. A recent study showed that 95% of Americans regularly rely on some form of broadcast

media for news on national and international events, while only 29% reported they rely on
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dominance in terms of audience, broadcast media has become a critical news source that overwhelmingly influences public debate. Moreover, the owners of media sources and their agents control this debate
through their discretionary choice of information that is disseminated.
Ownership of media sources, therefore, impacts the diversity of perspectives provided by those sources. The owners' discretion to report
information is a formidable right that remains broad and largely un-

fettered unless tempered by such public externalities as viewer prefer89
ence or governmental regulation.
In recognition of media's influence on public debate, Congress has
historically enacted legislation that furthers deliberative democracy
and, commensurately, multiplicity. 90 By congressional authority, the

FCC has attempted to diversify public discourse through the enforcement of certain broadcast rules. 91 One such rule was the fairness doctrine, which required broadcasters to give sufficient coverage to
opposing views on public issues. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,92

the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality

of the doctrine, and decided that broadcasters acted as public trustees
national newspapers, such as the New York Times. Roper Ctr. at Univ. of Conn., America on the
Eve of War Survey (March 14, 2003), at http://web.lexis-nexis.comluniverse/formacademic/
s roper.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2003). See Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 20, at 870
(noting political candidates' use of television in conducting their campaigns, notably because
"television provides the most effective means of generating a mass audience").
89. Kathleen Q. Abernathy, The Role of the Federal CommunicationsCommission on the Path
from the Vast Wasteland to the Fertile Plain, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 435, 437-38 (2003) (noting that
even though media owners control the content of their stations' programming, that control does
not go unchecked by the public's preferences); Carl Hilliard, ConstitutionalConflict over Race
and Gender Preferences in Commercial Radio and Television Licensing, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 343,
347-48 (1990) (noting as the basis for the FCC's preference in limiting the number of licenses
one company can obtain, the assumption that a larger number of owners will lead to a larger
number of viewpoints, thus programming decisions reflecting a wider range of opinions); see
generally Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting,64 S. CAL. L. REV.
293 (1991) (acknowledging media owners' control over programming decisions, but analyzing
whether the decision-making process is, in fact, influenced by the sex and race of the owner).
90. See National Endowment for the Arts, 20 U.S.C. § 954 (2000) (founding the NEA for the
purpose of encouraging a diversity of ideas and views); Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a
World of Techno-BureaucraticDecisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REV.
559, 562 (1997) (noting agency structures that are designed by Congress to encourage regulations
that reflect a diversity of perspectives). See also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)
(finding that the minority ownership preference policies adopted by the FCC were supported by
strong congressional backing and the important governmental objective of the broadcasting of
diverse views); but see Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 138 n.93 (arguing that "Congress's failure to codify the diversity
preference suggests" weaker support than viewed by the Court).
91. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (creating the Federal Communications Commission for the purpose of regulating broadcast communications).
92. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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based on the affording of an economic privilege in the form of a
93
license.
Notwithstanding its noble goal, the fairness doctrine ultimately fell
into judicial and administrative disrepute. Courts criticized its exces94
sive impingement on expressive rights and dubious effectiveness.
With the advent of new media forms and the questionable notion of
95
scarcity, the FCC ultimately revoked the fairness doctrine.
Instead of direct content regulation through such means as the fairness doctrine, the FCC continued to influence broadcast behavior
through regulations that either established preferences for certain dis96
advantaged individuals seeking proprietary rights in media sources,
or restricted the percentage of ownership of certain media forms. 97
Both of these regulatory mechanisms, despite their objectives to further multiplicity, 98 have incurred considerable scrutiny in recent years.

As explained more cogently below, the agency's preference programs
93. Id. at 390.
94, See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (striking down the
FCC's fairness doctrine as contrary to "both the public's right to diverse sources of information
and the broadcaster's interest in free expression") (emphasis added).
95. In Syracuse Peace Council, the court held that the Commission's findings on the increased
diversity of outlets and programming in the then current market adequately supported its refusal. Id. at 669.
96. The FCC's programs include lottery ((Communications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 309(1),
(i)(3)(C)(ii), (i)(3)(A) (1994)); comparative hearing preferences ((47 U.S.C. § 3090) (Supp. III
1997)); distress sales (Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-72, 579-89 (1990) (affirming
the FCC's policy race-based policy in distress sales), Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership
of Broad. Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 980-81 (1978) (arguing for support of distress sales which
were designed to increase minority ownership and, consequently, contribute to viewpoint diversity); and tax certificates (26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994), Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of
Broad. Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 983). The agency's lottery program was particularly designed to
give traditional minority groups a greater opportunity for source ownership. See 47 U.S.C.
§309(i) (1994). For a more detailed discussion of these programs and their implications, see
Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 20, at 825-28; see also Spitzer, supra note 89, at 297-302.
97. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (creating the Federal Communications Commission, for the purpose of regulating broadcast communications); Id. § 533(c) (authorizing the FCC to "prescribe rules with respect to the ownership or control of cable systems
by persons who own or control other media of mass communications which serve the same community served by a cable system"). The FCC has recently proposed new regulations regarding
the limits on broadcast ownership. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,355
(Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 47). Before this promulgation, the rules prohibited
any entity from controlling television stations which reach an excess of 35% of all television
households in the United States. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2002). The proposed rule would
raise that limit to 45% and allow cross-ownership (of television, radio, and newspaper companies) in the same market. See generally Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,355.
Michael Powell, Chairman of the FCC, has stated that the increase in the limit is justified by a
changed media marketplace, which supports an abundance of media sources, including cable and
satellite service providers. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 96-97.
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that implicate race or ethnicity have become suspectible to constitutional attack.
B.
1.

The PrecariousState of Programs That Promote Multiplicity

Guarded Judicial Tolerance of Governmental Programs That
Foster Multiplicity
Multiplicity's theoretical nexus with democracy justifies governmen-

tal efforts that encourage its embrace by the media. Multiplicity of
voice ensures fuller dissemination of information and resultantly en-

riches public discourse. 99 Given this fundamental construct, one
might surmise that the judiciary would support governmental strategies that encourage multiplicity, even if those strategies implicate race.
Early Supreme Court decisions tend to support this view. 100 In fact,
these earlier decisions confirm the legitimacy of limited rules that enhance diversity and enrich public debate through prescriptions that
expand minority ownership. 10 1
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 10 2 the Supreme Court concluded that a
federal program requiring a ten percent award of federal public works

grants to minority contractors was permissible under equal protection
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment. 0 3 Instead of strict

scrutiny or another standard of equal protection review, the Court justified its finding on the remedial power of Congress to correct past

discriminatory behavior and the systemic pattern of discrimination in
the award of federal construction grants.1 0 4 Six years later, the Supreme Court commenced greater scrutiny of race-based remedies. In
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,0 5 a plurality of the Court
struck down a collective bargaining agreement that allowed local

school authorities to limit the number of minority teachers eligible for
layoff. The Court indicated that the Equal Protection Clause of the
99. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text (noting multiplicity's furtherance of deliberative democracy and its compatibility with a respect-model of autonomy).
100. See generally FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (finding the
diversification of mass communications through the regulation of broadcast ownership to be a
judicially sustainable tactic to promote a compelling public interest).
101. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that the First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public"); see generally FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (holding that a policy promoting the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse sources is consistent with the First
Amendment).
102. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
103. Id. at 491-92.
104. Id. at 489.
105. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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Fourteenth Amendment required a demonstration of past discrimina10 6
tion by the government.

The judiciary's seeming hostility toward remedial programs predicated on race became most evident in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. 107 In Croson, a contractor challenged a directive that gen-

eral contractors who were awarded city construction contracts must
subcontract at least thirty percent of the total contract amount to one
or more minority business enterprises. The thirty percent set-aside,
however, did not apply to contracts awarded to minority-owned general contractors. 10 8 In its holding, the Court distinguished Fullilove,

noting that the City of Richmond, unlike Congress, did not have the
remedial power granted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. The city could implement remedial programs if it demonstrated
that it had participated in systematic racial discrimination in the local
construction industry. The city, however, did not substantiate the

prevalence of overt discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. The Court, accordingly, opined that the city lacked a compel-

ling interest that justified the apportionment of public contracts on the
basis of race. 10 9
One year after Croson, the Supreme Court seemingly mollified its

stance against programs that expand proprietary opportunities for minorities in the broadcast industry. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 110 the Court reviewed a challenge to FCC regulations that provided a preference for those who either sought new licenses or at-

tempted to purchase existing stations. The resultant diversification of
ownership could ultimately foster multiplicity within the media industry.'
As the Court observed, the FCC's rules sought to expand the
control of mass media sources 1 2 and thereby secure more diversity in
the information disseminated by these broadcast outlets. 113 The regu106. Id. at 274.
107. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
108. Id. at 477-78.
109. Id. at 505.
110. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
111. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text (defining multiplicity in terms of viewpoint
diversity).
112. In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television Sys.; and Inquiry into the Dev. of Communications
Tech. and Servs. To Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals,
39 F.C.C.2d 377, 391 (1973).
113. See FCC Abandons Proposal To Limit Multiple Ownership of Cable TV Systems, and
Initiates New Proposal To Permit Ownership of Cable Systems by Major TV Networks; Amendment to the Commission's Rules Relative to Diversification of Control of Community Antenna
Television Systems, 4(10) EN'. L. REP. 2, 3 (1982). The author notes that "the FCC's 'crossownership' rule was designed to foster diversification of control of the channels of mass commu-
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lations manifested the FCC's recognition of the critical intersection

between viewpoint diversity and ownership of media sources. 114 Responding to the challenge that the FCC's regulations violated the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,
the Court held that the agency's preference programs served the important governmental objective of promoting diversity within the
broadcast industry. Furthermore, the agency's regulations were substantially related to achieving that objective.'

15

The Court ultimately

concluded that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress for such an important purpose as diversity need satisfy intermediate, rather than the strict scrutiny applied to state and local
1 6

preference programs."'
Decisions subsequent to Metro Broadcasting, Inc., however, suggested a discernable shift in the Court's view of remedial programs
predicated on race. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'1 7 the

Court retreated completely from its tolerance of race-based programs.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor repudiated the
Metro Broadcasting decision as aberrational and inapposite to

Croson's requirement that governmental programs must survive strict
scrutiny. The Court, accordingly, overruled Metro Broadcasting,Inc.,
and found that the federal set-aside program that created racial prefnication" and addresses three concerns: the fear that the networks "would restrict the amount
and diversity of programming supplied to ... cable systems in order to minimize competition for
their network television programming"; the concern that "network-owned cable systems would
refuse to carry the programming of rival networks .. . thus hinder[ing] the development of new
cable networks altogether"; and the fear that "permitting [the networks] to own cable systems
would increase their already dominant position." See also Timothy G. Gauger, Comment, The
Constitutionalityof the FCC's Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast Licenses, 83 Nw.
U. L. REV. 665, 671-72 (1989) (citing a 1965 FCC Policy Statement as stating that the criteria it
would use in comparative hearings were whether the outcome resulted in the best practicable
service to the public and a maximum of diffusion of control of the media of mass communications, referred to as diversification); Alison Melnick, Comment, Access to Cable Television: A
Critique of the Affirmative Duty Theory of the First Amendment, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1409
(1982) (noting the Court's finding that the rationale for promoting diversity in broadcasting rests
upon the belief that the purpose of the first amendment is to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail") (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
114. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 566.
115. Id. at 600.
116. See id. at 564-65 (holding that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress
... are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives"). Metro Broadcasting was eventually overruled on different grounds by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515
U.S. 200 (level of judicial analysis applied to the review of all racial classifications imposed by
federal, state, or local governments is strict scrutiny).
117. 515 U.S. 200.
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erences in highway construction contracting violated Fifth Amend8
ment due process norms."1
Adarand seemingly galvanized the Court's enmity toward race-conscious remedies for past discrimination. Any such program that uses
race as a foundational premise must survive strict scrutiny to ensure
that it furthers a compelling governmental interest.11 9
Imposition of a strict scrutiny standard appeared to have struck a
deathblow for race-based, remedial programs. Justice O'Connor,
however, rejected this "strict in theory, but fatal in fact" view. 120 She
believed that preference programs could withstand scrutiny if the government narrowly tailored those programs to further a compelling interest. Yet Justice O'Connor's attempt to debunk the fatalism of strict
scrutiny rang hollow in light of Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas's views on the matter. Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Adarand noted that the government could never have an interest compelling enough to sanction discrimination based on race to atone for
past racial discrimination. 121 Justice Thomas added that programs
predicated on race "can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination." 122 Judging only from his concurring vote,
Justice Anthony Kennedy likely supported, to some extent, this more
suspect view of remedial programs. Without a seismic shift in thinking
among the Justices, it seemed unlikely that any race-based program
would survive strict scrutiny.
Justice O'Connor's dicta regarding the possible viability of racebased remedies, nonetheless, had a prophetic ring. The critical question left unanswered in Adarand was whether the achievement of diversity in any context constitutes a compelling state interest. The
Court answered this question in the much anticipated case of Grutter
123
v. Bollinger.

118. Id. at 227.
119. Id. at 235. The Court held that "[flederal racial classifications, like those of a State, must
serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." Id. (construing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)).
120. Id. at 202.
121. Id.
122. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 241.

123. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), reh'g denied 124 S. Ct. 35 (2003). See Leonard M. Baynes, Paradoxesof Racial Stereotypes, Diversity and Past Discriminationin Establishing Affirmative Action in FCC Broadcast Licensing, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 979, 981 (2000) (stating
that the Adarand decision was problematic in that "the court did not express an opinion on

whether diversity was still a compelling governmental interest ....
[I]t calls into question the
legitimacy of all FCC affirmative action programs based on diversity, and it fails to take into
account that the FCC programs were premised on strong First Amendment considerations").
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The Subtle Implications of Grutter v. Bollinger on Race-Based
Programs that Further Multiplicity

Grutter focused on a program designed to enhance diversity within
higher education. The facts of the case included a white Michigan resident who, with a 3.8 grade point average and 161 LSAT score, challenged her denial of admission to the University of Michigan Law
School. She alleged that the law school's use of race as a predominant
factor significantly enhanced the chances of admission of certain minority group members at the expense of applicants from disfavored
racial groups. 124 The University of Michigan argued that a diverse
student body constituted a compelling interest that justified the con125
sideration of race in admissions.
The Court commenced with a predictive analysis of Grutter. Writing for the majority once again, Justice O'Connor first reiterated that
governmental actions based on race should be reviewed under strict
scrutiny to ensure that the government had not infringed an individuals's right to equal protection of the laws. 126 Similar to her finding in
Adarand, she discounted the view that strict scrutiny automatically
dooms a remedial program. She emphasized that race-based governmental actions should be reviewed within the context in which they
are applied. To this end, the University of Michigan Law School argued that the state had a compelling interest to maintain a diverse
127
student body in higher education.
Under the first prong of strict scrutiny analysis, the Court endorsed
Justice Lewis Powell's view, which he expressed in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 128 that a diverse student body constitutes a compelling state interest that supports the consideration of
race in university admissions. 12 9 The Court rejected the notion that
only government programs that used race to remedy past discrimination could survive scrutiny. 130 Emphasizing the uniqueness of the educational context, the Court observed: "Given the important purpose
of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a spe'1 3
cial niche in our constitutional tradition." '
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2332-33.
Id.
Id. at 2338 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
Id.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 2337.
Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2339.
Id.
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The Court in Grutter then shifted its focus to strict scrutiny's second
prong, which requires governmental programs to be narrowly tailored.
The majority determined that a quota system that insulates each category of applicants from competition with all other applicants would
not satisfy this requirement. 132 Race or ethnicity merely constituted
133
one positive factor in a candidate's overall application.
The Court ultimately found the University of Michigan Law
School's admissions program to have been "holistic" in its review of
applications, and functioned to discover how the applicant, regardless
of race, could contribute to the university's goal of diversity. 3 4 The
Law School's program was constitutional, and it adequately ensured
that all factors that impact diversity were meaningfully considered
135
alongside race.
The implications of Grutter, particularly as it relates to race-based
programs that further multiplicity in the media industry, remain to be
seen. Similar to the University of Michigan's argument in Grutter,one
might posit that diversity constitutes a compelling governmental objective for the media industry. Programs that diversify the ownership
of media sources could broaden public discourse and, accordingly,
augment media's service to a democracy that thrives to ensure mutual
respect for the expressive rights of all citizens of society. 136 Governmental programs that enhance opportunities for historically discounted groups potentially foster multiplicity, which, in turn, fosters
reciprocal respect for the autonomous expressive rights of others. 137
Of course, one may argue that race-based set-asides potentially
prompt those who feel unfairly disadvantaged by these programs to
become hostile toward the rights of the historically disadvantaged.
Yet this potential attitudinal effect represents only one, perhaps shortterm, impact of set-asides. These programs serve as procedural constructs which, over time, diversify the power structures of media
132. Id. at 2342.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2343.
135. Id. at 2344.
136. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text (discussing multiplicity's compatibility with
a mutual respect theory of democracy).
137. Of course, one may argue that race-based set-aside and similar programs potentially
cause those who feel disadvantaged by these programs to become hostile or unsympathetic to
the autonomous rights of historically disadvantaged groups such as minorities and women. I
posit, however, that mutual respect of autonomous rights constitutes a procedural as well as
attitudinal construct. Viewed within the lens of procedural manifestations of respect, race-based
programs provide minorities and women greater access to public discourse through ownership of
sources. This enhanced participation theoretically compels consideration of the views of those
whose voices may have been minimized, muted, or ignored.
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sources. That diversification has the potential to ensure greater sensitivity to the views of traditionally marginalized groups, maximize participation by members of those groups in public discourse and,
138
therefore, enrich democratic processes.
Justice O'Connor has clearly warned, however, that the Court's
finding of racial diversity as a compelling interest was confined to the
educational context. 13 9 Grutter's limited applicability portends the
vulnerability of race-based programs designed to further multiplicity
within the media industry. Despite their utilitarian objectives, these
programs face the formidable challenge of strict scrutiny and proof of
a compelling governmental interest in diverse ownership of media
sources. The Court's requirement of a demonstrative nexus between
diverse ownership and viewpoint diversity looms as an impediment to
the constitutionality of these programs. This reality, together with the
difficulty of narrowly tailoring these programs, may suggest the need
to expand interventionist strategies beyond the spectrum of race.
Others, particularly Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., have
echoed this sentiment and criticized the FCC's implementation of
preferences when the Commission has fundamentally failed to connect minority ownership to viewpoint diversity. 140
Clearly, race-based programs designed to foster multiplicity face
formidable legal challenges. Race-consciousness aside, however, one
might assume that carefully crafted, race-neutral rules that minimize
the monopolization of media sources would constitute permissible and
governmentally preferable means to ensure viewpoint diversity. The
FCC, nonetheless, appears poised to relax its legally viable programs
that prevent media conglomeration and, commensurately, further
multiplicity.

138. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that a mutual-respect theory of
democracy enhances public debate); but see infra note 140 and accompanying text (offering cogent arguments that race-based set-asides in the media industry are basically ineffectual).
139. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
140. Professor Krotoszynski and A. Richard M. Blaiklock challenge the FCC's notion that its
regulations that increase minority ownership of, or decision-making authority in, media sources
furthers viewpoint diversity. Krotoszynski and Blaiklock observe that the lack of nexus between
a person's status as a minority and her viewpoints. Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 20, at
825. They, in fact, state that "it is insulting to assume that minority station owners would be
more likely to forego sound business decisions to pursue an ideological agenda." Id. at 852.
Thus, utilizing race or gender as a shorthand for the identification of group viewpoint is inherently imprecise. Id. at 856.
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975

FCC's Modification of the Rules that Promote Multiplicity

The FCC has historically attempted to promote multiplicity with
race-neutral rules that controlled broadcast source ownership.' 4' The

original rules restricting ownership of certain media sources responded to concern over the scarcity of broadcast frequencies for
over-the-air broadcast mediums. 142 Despite their longstanding utility
and legal viability, these rules have come under increased scrutiny by

the agency.
A policy rationale for the FCC's more intense review relates to the
rules' impact on economic efficiency. t 43 Rules that modify commer-

cial behavior often draw criticism due to their interference with the
144
natural forces of a competitive market.

141. FCC National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1) (2002).
The Rule states:
[N]o license for a commercial TV broadcast station shall be granted, transferred or
assigned to any party.., if the grant, transfer or assignment of such license would result
in such party.., owning, operating or controlling, or having a cognizable interest in TV
stations which have an aggregate national audience reach exceeding 35 percent.
Id.
142. See Lili Levi, Reporting the Official Truth: The Revival of the FCC's News Distortion
Policy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1106 (2000) (noting the traditional rationalization of regulating
the broadcast medium as based on the scarcity of broadcast frequencies).
143. For varying definitions of economic efficiency, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-15 (4th ed. 1992) (defining economic efficiency as a state in which goods
are allocated to those who will pay the highest price); Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845, 1855
(2003) (noting that market economics defines economic efficiency as "meeting consumer preferences"); Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the Mentally
Ill, 12 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 67, 84 (1995) (noting that "[t]he positive economic
theory of tort law defines economic efficiency as wealth maximization"). Some commentators
believe that government regulation of the flow of commerce or bargaining behavior interferes
with the efficiency of the market. The securities market, in general, is suspect to allegations of
inefficiency due to regulation. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE

STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing that the restrictive regulation of insider information decreases
the efficiency of the securities market); see Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 61-62 (2003) (positing that regulations limiting the
information available to bargaining parties "for the benefit of the behaviorally challenged,"
could result in diminished efficiency in the securities market, thereby increasing the risk to investors, "raising the cost of capital and thereby constricting the range of available investment opportunities for investors"); cf. Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent:
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1091 (2003) (arguing that Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), passed by the SEC to cut down on insider trading and even the informational playing field, reduces agency costs and improves market efficiency).
144. See Chris Baker, FCC Chief Sees Upsets for the Giants; 'High Tech' Means Swift Changes,
WASH. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2003, § 1, at 1 (noting Michael Powell's, Chairman of the FCC's, belief in
the power of free markets and push towards less regulation); Jim Kirk, FCC Eases Restrictions
for Media, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 2003, at Al (citing Chairman Powell as justifying the relaxing of
regulations on media ownership by the need for over-the-air broadcasters to grow, thus reducing
costs and helping improve profitability in the light of the advent of cable and satellite providers);
Dick Polman, New Rules May Alter U.S. Media Ownership, Likely Revisions Could Limit the
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Perhaps the most significant catalyst for the review of these rules,
however, is the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the Telecom Act). 14 5
The Telecom Act seeks to "reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies."' 146 To fulfill this goal, the Telecom Act eliminates provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast stations
that could be owned by one entity nationally, and it also raises the
limits on the number of AM and FM stations that one entity could
own in a single market. 147 The Telecom Act also softens limitations
on national television station ownership to thirty percent, and directs
the FCC to investigate the necessity of limits on television station
148
ownership within a given market.
The dominant objective of the Telecom Act is deregulation of the
broadcast industry. 149 The FCC must accordingly engage in rulemaking to reexamine the continued utility of ownership rules. Note the
Telecom Act's precise language on this point:
In every even-numbered year... the Commission-(1) shall review
all regulations issued under this Act... that apply to the operations
or activities of any provider of telecommunications service; and (2)
shall determine whether any such regulation is no longer necessary
in the public interest as the result of meaningful economic competi150
tion between providers of such service.
Pursuant to the Telecom Act's directive, the FCC conducted
rulemaking procedures to determine the continued efficacy of rules
that restrict ownership of media sources.151 Michael K. Powell, the
FCC's chair, summarized the Commission's charge and focus:
Over the past twenty months we have been working tirelessly towards achieving three critically important goals: (1) Reinstating leDiversity of Voices, Views, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 1, 2003, at A1 (noting that the large conglomerate firms, such as Viacom and Disney, have lobbied the FCC, arguing that market forces,
rather than regulation of ownership, would ensure diversity, competition, and localism).
145. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 1, 110 Stat. 56.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 202.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 1; Pete Schulberg, Itsy-Bitsy Chip for TV; Big Leap for Parents,PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 20, 1996, at D1 (noting the deregulation of the communications industry with the
passing of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
150. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 402 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 161(a) (2000)).
151. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Sets Limits on Media
Concentration (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
DOC-235047Al.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (noting the recent comprehensive review of ownership regulation and the FCC's goal of encompassing in the final rules, the protection of "diversity, localism and competition in the American media system"); Telecommunications Act of
1996, § 402, 110 Stat. at 129 (describing the purpose of biennial review of ownership regulations).
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gaily enforceable broadcast ownership limits that promote diversity,
localism and competition (replacing those that have been struck
down by the courts); (2) Building modern rules that take proper
account of the explosion of new media outlets for news, information
and entertainment, rather than perpetuate the graying rules of a bygone black and white era; and (3) Striking a careful balance that
does not unduly limit transactions that promote the public interest,
152
while ensuring that no company can monopolize the medium.
The FCC continued to emphasize the need for restricted ownership
in order to preserve competition and viewpoint diversity. 153 Yet, despite this finding for continued restriction, the FCC voted to modify
present rules to increase the percentage of media sources that may be
controlled by a single owner. The majority of the commissioners argued that the merger of television stations would result in better news
programming. 154 They also believed that the new rules would protect
over-the-air broadcast networks from the economic squeeze associ1 55
ated with the advent of cable and satellite providers.
The modified rules would continue to prohibit any mergers among
the top four networks (ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC); however, they
would allow media companies to own a conglomeration of stations
that reach up to forty-five percent of U.S. television households. The
new rules would also remove the previous broadcast-newspaper and
radio-television cross-ownership restrictions. Such hybrid ownerships
could occur in markets with four or more television stations. The new
rules retain limits on local radio ownership. A single company may
own eight stations (five in each class of FM or AM) in markets of
forty-five or more stations; seven stations (four in each class) in markets of thirty to forty-four stations; six stations (four in each class) in
markets of fifteen to twenty-nine stations; and five stations (three in
1 56
each class) in markets of fourteen or fewer stations.
The FCC's decision to amend the ownership rules was far from
unanimous. In fact, two of the commissioners wrote spirited dissents.
Commissioner Michael J. Copps objected to the majority's approval
of the rule modifications on both procedural and substantive grounds.
152. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Press Statement of Michael K.
Powell (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatchDoc2350473A.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
153. See id. (noting that the new rules still retained restrictions against networks merging and
tightened limits on radio ownership).
154. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Separate Statement of Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatach/Doc-235047A4.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
155. Id.
156. For a copy of the recently-promulgated rules on media concentration, see Broadcast
Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
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His objections focused on the FCC's failure to complete sufficient
analysis to confirm the effect of the modified rule on consumers. He
attacked the rules on substantive grounds, arguing that the FCC arbitrarily raised the limits on media ownership without assessing fully the
effects of this change on local media voices. In sum, Copps believed
the FCC put the competitive interests of the major broadcast networks before those of the public who seek locally originated news programming and diverse perspectives. Despite these factors, Copps
157
opined that the courts would not find the rules to be arbitrary.
Commissioner Jonathon S. Adelstein echoed Copps's arguments
and added that the majority lacked demonstrative evidence to justify
additional mergers of media sources. Adelstein stated that the studies
on which the majority relied had been attacked on many levels and
158
were generally criticized as unreliable.
Public reaction to the FCC's proposed changes has been predictably
swift and vociferous. 159 Some have applauded the FCC's rule change
as a stimulus for growth in the industry. 160 Reactions from members
of Congress, however, have been mixed. Leadership in the House refuses to interfere with the FCC's proposed change.' 6 1 The Senate,
157. See generally Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps Dissenting (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A9.doc (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
158. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of Commissioner
Jonathan S. Adelstein Dissenting (June 2, 2003) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/Doc-235047A8.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
159. See David Ho, New Media Rules Put FCC Chief on the Spot; Michael Powell's Moves
That Eased Restrictions on Ownership Left Him at Odds with Members of Congress from Both
Parties, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 5, 2003, at El (noting the negative political pressure the Chairman has received from both Republicans and Democrats following the promulgation of the new
rules on media ownership); Janet Hook, GOP-Led Congress Increasingly Defies Bush, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, at Al (noting that a large majority of both conservatives and liberals in the
House came together to approve a bill blocking the FCC rules); see also John C. Roberts, Dishonest Communications Reform, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2003, § 1 at 25. The author, Dean emeritus
and professor of law at DePaul University College of Law, criticizes the explanations Chairman
Powell has provided for the new rules, calling them "blatantly disingenuous, if not dishonest
.... Id. .
160. See Associated Press, Senators Say They Can Force Vote On FCC Rule, CHI. TRIB., July
30, 2003, § 3, at 4 (noting the Bush Administration's support of the rule changes and subsequent
threat to use a presidential veto to block any bill Congress may pass which rolls back the cap
limits). The author also notes that many media companies support the change as necessary to
promote growth and competition in a market saturated with cable and satellite television providers. Id. See also Richard Simon & Janet Hook, FCC Rule May Bring a Veto Standoff, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 2003, at C1 (noting House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman W.J.
"Billy" Tauzin's (R-La.) firm support of the FCC decision).
161. See H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. (2003). Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-N.Y.) proposed
an amendment to the appropriations bill that would prohibit funds to be used by the FCC for the
implementation of the new rules. The amendment failed by a vote of 174-254. The appropria-
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however, has introduced an extraordinary bill that would modify, if
not veto, the FCC's new rule. Approved by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 19, 2003, the Senate bill
would prevent excessive concentration of the nation's television
broadcast stations. 162 The bill, if ultimately endorsed by Congress,
would effectively block the FCC's new rules and reinstate previous
limitations on media ownership. 16 3 Congressional consensus to modify the FCC's proposed change will not end this controversy, however.
President George W. Bush promises to veto any legislation that alters
164
the FCC's new rule.

C.
1.

The Promotion of Multiplicity in Media Decision MakingGovernmental Incentives and Voluntary Adoption

Toward a Broader View of Scarcity

The FCC's justifications notwithstanding, 165 there remain significant
factors that bode against the relaxation of media source ownership
rules. Even FCC Chairman Powell, a staunch supporter of the relaxed
rules, acknowledges the need to guard against the monopolization of
tions bill as passed, however, did roll back the percentage of homes that stations owned by overthe-air networks could reach from 45% back to the original 35%. Id.
162. See S. 1046, 108th Cong. (2003).
163. See also Senate To Vote On 'Congressional Veto' of FCC Media Ownership Rules, 23
COMM. DAILY 146 (2003) (noting that the bill, if approved, would codify the 35% broadcast
ownership cap and include a cross-ownership cap and radio divestiture). Of course, the veto of
agency decisions is articulated in congressional legislation. Title V, Chapter 8 of the U.S. Code
governs congressional review of agency rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2000). That chapter provides that before a rule can take effect, the promulgating agency must submit the rule, along with
supporting documentation to each house of Congress. Id. § 801(a)(1). The rule takes effect
upon submission to Congress, but Congress may then void the rule through a joint resolution of
disapproval, which may or may not be vetoed by the President. Id. §§ 801(a)(2)-802. In the
event of an un-vetoed joint resolution, the rule may not be reissued in a substantially similar
form. Id. § 801(b)(2). A "major rule," however, does not take immediate effect, but instead
must endure at least a sixty-day waiting period after submission to Congress or publication in the
Federal Register. Id. § 801(a)(3)(A). A major rule is defined as:
[A]ny rule that the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
of the Office of Management and Budget finds has resulted in or is likely to result in
(A) an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more; (B) a major increase in
costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government
agencies, or geographic regions; or (C) significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based
enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets.
Id. § 804(2).
164. See Associated Press, supra note 160 (noting the Bush Administration's threat of using a
Presidential veto); see also David Lieberman, House Vote on Media Ownership Slams FCC, USA
TODAY, July 28, 2003, at B4 (noting that by attaching a challenge to the FCC's regulations to the
appropriations bill, the House signals that it is confident it will survive a presidential veto).
165. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC's proposed change
to rules limiting ownership of broadcast sources).
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media sources. He states this view irrespective of the proliferation of
166
media sources.
If we accept ownership regulation as a mechanism that furthers
multiplicity, then the discussion should shift to the extent of restricted
ownership. The extent of that restriction, however, defies calculation.
In fact, any rule, past or present, has not definitively linked the percentage of ownership to the increase or decrease in the diversity of
views disseminated by competing sources. This factor may have tacitly contributed to the drive to relax the FCC's rules. To modify these
longstanding rules on this basis, however, seems short-sighted at best.
The effect of conglomerate ownership would, at the very least, be intuitive. Intuition notwithstanding, the lack of a precise calculus of
ownership influence on informational flow does not justify an arbitrary reduction of ownership restrictions.
Commissioner Copps's dissent points to the capricious manner in
which the FCC arrived at the raised ownership ceiling of broadcast
sources. According to Copps, other uncontested studies demonstrated that a thirty-five percent limitation on ownership bolstered affiliates' power to preempt network programming to promote the goal
of localism. The commissioners who voted to modify the rules apparently have ignored this fact. Instead, they find the increased ceiling of
forty-five percent necessary to preserve competition among over-theair networks. Copps, however, believes that the competition among
these sources and their commercial viability remain secure. He argues
that the majority fails to acknowledge that over-the-air networks are
guaranteed carriage to cable subscribers and maintain the greatest
reach of any medium of mass communications. Thus, competition, at
least among over-the-air and cable broadcasters, has been equalized
under present, more stringent ownership restrictions. Copps further
observed that the majority produces no evidence demonstrating that
raising ownership limits to forty-five percent would promote the public interest goals of diversity, localism, and competition. 67
As the history of regulation confirms and Chairman Powell observes, the principal justification for restricted ownership remains the
scarcity of sources from which individuals receive news information.
Powell, in his July 2, 2003 statement accompanying the notice of proposed rulemaking, referenced the diversity index that assigns assessment weights to various media outlets. After reviewing the results of
a survey of 3,000 Americans, the assigned weight corresponds to the
166. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text (noting the need for continued limitations on media ownership).
167. See Press Release, Statement of Michael J. Copps, supra note 157, at 10-11.
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value consumers place on various sources within those outlets (radio,
newspapers, broadcast television, and the Internet) for news and information. Powell posits that the diversity index supports the rule
change because it does not distinguish the news content of sources
within those outlets. 168 Copps, however, finds the reliability of the
diversity index suspect because it fails to distinguish between the
amount of local news provided by a local affiliate station, for example
NBC, and news provided by a cable source such as the Home Shop69
ping Network.
In my view, Copps's argument has considerable validity. He tacitly
argues for a broader view of "scarcity. '' 170 I heartily agree. An empirical determination of scarcity must reflect the dominant sources from
which individuals receive news of social or political import. The
FCC's present conceptualization of scarcity relies solely upon the
sheer number of any media sources for news, regardless of the size of
the audience that those sources attract. 171 This singular definition of
scarcity is both misleading and myopic.
An increase in the aggregate number of media sources does not signal an end to the scarcity of sources that are most consulted for news.
If broadcast outlets and newspapers continue to dominate the market
as sources for news and information, then monopolization of those
sources threatens dissemination of different viewpoints. An increase
in alternative and underused sources does not ensure that individuals
will be exposed to a variety of opinions. If the objective is to maximize the dissemination of complete information to the greatest number of constituents, then scarcity must be viewed in terms of the
number of sources from which individuals primarily obtain news and
information.
Several polls have documented the dominance of broadcast media
and newspaper as sources for news. In a January nationwide study
conducted by the University of Connecticut, pollsters were asked,
"Overall, where would you say you get most of your news from: tele-

168. See Press Release, Statement of Michael K. Powell, supra note 152.
169. See Press Release, Statement of Michael J. Copps, supra note 157.
170. Id.
171. See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of Chairman
Michael K. Powell, at 8 (July 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-03-127A3.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (arguing that the previous ban on newspaper-broadcast or radio-television ownership could not be "justified as necessary in the public
interest in light of the abundance of diverse sources available to citizens for their news consumption," namely the proliferation of news sources via cable television and the internet). Id.
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vision, newspapers, radio, magazines, the Internet, or some other
source?" The responses to the survey question were as follows:
Television
Newspapers
Radio
Internet
Some other source
Magazines

Don't Know

65%
21%
9%
2%
2%
1%
1%172

During March 2003, the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut surveyed 1,005 registered likely voters nationwide. Ninety-five
percent of those polled responded that they regularly consult broadcast news on the major networks, a cable channel like CNN, or public
broadcast stations such as National Public Radio to receive news
about national and international events. In the same survey, thirty-six
percent responded that they regularly read a magazine such as Time,
Newsweek, U.S. News, or The Economist for national and international information. Twenty-nine percent indicated that they regularly
read a national newspaper such as the Washington Post, the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal,the Los Angeles Times, or the Financial
Times for news. 173 In a similar poll of 3,002 Americans taken April 26
through May 12, 2002, seventy-eight percent stated that they watched
TV news programs regularly. Fifty-three percent of respondents
watched TV network evening news programs regularly. 174
In a December 2002 poll, the Gallup Company also sampled individuals regarding their source preferences for news. This poll
presented the following questions and resultant responses: "[P]lease
indicate how often you get your news from each of the following
sources-every day, several times a week, occasionally, or never.
172. The News Media/Communications, at http://www.pollingreport.com/media/htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (citing a Meda Studies Center survey conducted by the University of Connecticut Jan. 11-18, 1999).
173. Roper Ctr. at Univ. of Conn., Public Opinion Online: Worldview 2003 America On the
Eve of War Survey: Press, Television (Mar. 3-8, 2003), at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=4d8a855b80d3891lf3510b27aaf64clf&_docnum=l&wchp=dGLbVzbzSkVA&_md5=a8d724f5146084a61ca6ad25d32936ce (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). See Catherine
E. Vance & Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J.
361, 364 n.12 (2003) (citing a survey by the Pew Center For Civic Journalism that found that 59%
of those asked responded that they watch local television news daily compared to 44% who
responded that they read a local daily newspaper).
174. Pew Research Ctr. for the People and the Press, Biennial Media Consumption Survey,
(Apr. 26-May 12, 2002), at http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PagelD=618 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2003).
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How about nightly network news programs on ABC, CBS or NBC?"
The responses were as follows:
Every day

43%

Several times a week

16%

Occasionally

25%

Never
15%
No opinion
1%
"Please indicate how often you get your news from each of the following sources-every day, several times a week, occasionally, or never.
How about public television news?" The responses were as follows:
Every day
35%
Several times a week
12%
Occasionally
29%
Never
24%
"Please indicate how often you get your news from each of the following sources-every day, several times a week, occasionally, or never.
How about local television news from TV stations in your area?" The
results of the poll were as follows:
Every day
57%
Several times a week
16%
Occasionally
18%
9%175
Never
These polls obviously lack the scientific precision of more formalized, sociological studies. This deficiency might consequently limit
their credibility. They constitute, nonetheless, probative barometers
of the public's preference for certain media sources. Despite the
proliferation of alternative sources for news and information, 176
broadcast media-television, newspaper, and radio-remain the overwhelmingly dominant sources for news and information.1 77 Most significant in these surveys is the fact that broadcast media consistently
ranks as the primary source for most individuals. Notwithstanding
procedural and methodological criticisms of these surveys, they substantiate the premise that a distinct segment of the media industrytelevision and newspaper-enjoys the largest audiences.
175. Gallup Poll: Media, Personal Priorities, Dec. 5-8, 2002, available at http://nationaljournal.com/members/polltrack/2003/todays/01/Ol06gallup.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
176. See Press Release, Statement of Michael K. Powell, supra note 171, at 4 (noting that
there are now three twenty-four-hour all-news networks, seven broadcast networks, and over
three hundred cable networks, and that 85% of television households are cable or satellite service subscribers).
177. See supra notes 172-177 and accompanying text.
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The mere existence of alternative, yet seldom used sources hardly
guarantees that diverse viewpoints on matters of governmental importance will be freely disseminated and, perhaps most important, received by a sizable audience. If one accepts the premise that
television and newspapers dominate the informational landscape, then
it stands to reason that monopolization of these dominant sources
looms as an impediment to multiplicity. 178 The presence of independent sources such as the Internet or private publications does not ensure the dissemination of a variety of viewpoints and perspectives.
Regulatory control of the ownership of dominant media sources,
therefore, constitutes the primary, if not solitary, tool required to
maximize viewpoint diversity.
2.

The Ideal Solution-NaturalIncentives for the Adoption of
Multiplicity

Consumer behavior and monopolistic tendencies support the need
for some degree of control over media ownership. Rules that govern
market behavior, however, will continually face criticism and scrutiny
due to their economic inefficiency and lack of precision.1 7 9 Media's
voluntary acceptance of multiplicity represents a more intellectually
and, perhaps, legally attractive alternative to regulatory control. The
question remains, however, whether volunteerism will truly work to
foster the widespread dissemination of diverse views and perspectives.
Many media sources expressly recognize their duty as the "Fourth
Estate ' 180 to disseminate divergent views on matters of governmental
importance.1 81 Perhaps this ethical obligation will prompt voluntary
178. See Steven Brill, Holding the Media Accountable in the Age of Osama, Kobe, and Arnold, Address at the Washington and Lee University's Ethics in Journalism Lecture Series (Oct.
3, 2003). Steven Brill agreed that the monopolization of media constituted a significant and
realistic barrier to responsible and responsive journalism.
179. See sources cited supra note 143 and accompanying text.
180. See sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing media's function as
the "Fourth Estate").
181. See Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standardof Care,53
FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 472-74 (1984) (noting the two most influential groups to promulgate
journalism codes of ethics are the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the American
Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE)). The SPJ Code of Ethics demands reporters be "honest,
fair and courageous in gathering, reporting and interpreting information." SPJ CODE OF ETHICS
(1996), available at http://www.spj.org/ethics-code.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). The Code also
requires journalists to "[r]ecognize a special obligation to ensure that the public's business is
conducted in the open and that government records are open to inspection." Id. The ASNE
Statement of Principles requires that journalists make efforts "to assure that the news content is
accurate, free from bias and in context, and that all sides are presented fairly." ASNE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, art. IV (2002), available at http://www.asne.orglkiosk/archive/principl.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2004). The Statement also encourages journalists to ensure that "an independent scrutiny [is brought] to bear on the forces of power in the society, including the conduct

CONTEMPORARY MEDIA

2004]

adoption of multiplicity. Despite their inherent limitations, ethical
codes, self-regulation, and public scrutiny can effectuate behavioral

changes that ensure the public's overall benefit.
One vivid example of voluntary behavior modification was media's
broadcasts of election returns subsequent to its embarrassing coverage
of the Florida polling results in the 2000 Bush-Gore presidential contest. 182 Blatant errors in those projections and the ensuing public consternation prompted many broadcast sources to change their
procedures for reporting the results in the 2002 midterm election contests. 183 In fact, I had the opportunity to test the reality of this behavioral change. As a specially invited guest of the Cable News Network

(CNN) on the night of the 2002 midterm election returns, I personally
witnessed CNN's (and, to a more limited extent, other networks') cautious deliberations on when to call contests on the November 5, 2002

election night. That experience confirmed, at least in the context of
election

reports,

media's proclivity

for self-imposed

behavior

modification. 184
Moral codes and affirmations as self-policing mechanisms do not,
however, ensure media's full embrace of multiplicity. For these codes

of conduct to have genuine utility, media sources must focus more
broadly on the rather holistic benefits associated with the dissemination of diverse viewpoints. Multiplicity's tendency to enhance the size
of an audience might be the catalyst that encourages its embrace. Dis-

semination of various perspectives on matters of public importance
creates a natural curiosity that attracts an audience. Multiplicity,
therefore, optimizes media's achievement of a larger audience. Re-

ports that include more diverse views create a synergy of contrary expression that virtually guarantees a sizable audience. For example,
broadcast sources generally secure better ratings, and a commensu-

rately larger and more diverse audience, when their programming
of official power at all levels of government." Id. at art. I. See also Erwin Chemerinsky &
Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator H, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 913, 915 n.8
(1997) (noting that the journalistic codes of ethics are voluntary).
182. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Morant, supra note 49 (describing media's erroneous projections of the 2000 election); Susan E. Seager & Laura R. Handman, Congress, the Networks, and Exit Polls, 18 COMM. LAW. 1 (2001); see also Pamela S.Karlan, Nothing
Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protectionfrom Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79
N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1360-61 (2001) (providing the narratives of two voters who, on their way to
the polls, decided not to vote because they had heard media reports that Gore carried Florida
and were "convinced that [their] vote[s] would be meaningless").
183. See generally Morant, supra note 49 (describing media's voluntary restraint in reporting
results in the 2002 midterm elections).
184. Id.
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presents various perspectives and opinions. 185 A discernable nexus
exists between debate, controversy, and audience interest. 186 Reporting a variety of views that appeal to a diverse populace, therefore,
heightens the probability of a sizable audience and contributes to
profit maximization.
Media's possible voluntary adoption of multiplicity does not eliminate the need to regulate control of media ownership. The basis for
voluntary adoption of multiplicity remains largely theoretical. Moreover, it does not, alone, ensure that media sources will report divergent
viewpoints on all matters of societal interest. The marked uncertainty
of volunteerism underscores the need for continued content-neutral
regulations. A minimalist approach to regulatory control of ownership would ensure viewpoint diversity and secure a pluralistic and deliberative form of democracy that values participatory discourse. 187
IV.

CONCLUSION

Media operates uniquely within a contemporary, pluralistic democracy. On one hand, it enjoys the autonomous right of choice and, as a
185. See Roland F.L. Hall, The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising,
45 MERCER L. REV. 705, 766 (1994) (noting that stations can secure better ratings and appeal to
larger audiences by providing programming with diverse opinions, such as following a conservative talk show host's program with one featuring a liberal host).
186. Reality programming, which has had its share of controversy and criticism, has generally
garnered high ratings. See Kimberlianne Podlas, Please Adjust Your Signal: How Television's
Syndicated Courtrooms Bias Our Juror Citizenry, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2001) (discussing the
popularity of courtroom reality television show, such as Judge Judy, which topped the Nielson
ratings index for daytime television shows); Francesca Ortiz, Zoning the Voyeur Dorm: Regulating Home-Based Voyeur Web Sites Through Land Use Laws, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 929, 931
(2001) (noting the new wave of reality television shows, and the accompanying boost in ratings);
Michael M. Epstein, JudgingJudy, Mablean and Mills: How Courtroom Programs Use Law to
ParadePrivateLives to Mass Audiences, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129 (2001) (noting that the rating
success of shows reality television shows have changes the landscape of primetime programming). Perhaps reality programming has become such a media staple because of its propensity
for high ratings, rather than its quality or informational utility. See Angelique M. Paul, Turning
the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About the Real Law?, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 668-69 (1997) (opining that Court TV has a propensity for televising sensational trials which garner higher ratings); Lincoln Caplan, Sport TV, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23,
1995, at 18, 20 (noting that CNN's rating increased quintupled when it televised the O.J. Simpson
proceedings); see also Philip Pettit, Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?, 5 BuFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 427, 433-34 (2002) (noting that increased readership of newspapers provides incentive for
the print media to "home in on" crimes of a shocking variety); Colleen T. Sealander, Standing
Behind Government-Subsidized Bipartisanship,60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1580, 1624 n.392 (1992)
(noting that televised debates are a great opportunity for candidates to reach the voting public,
namely because they overcome viewers' partisan interest and result in "increased viewership
from members of opposition parties").
187. See supra note 59, 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing the intersection of viewpoint
diversity and pluralistic democracy).
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consequence, disseminates information with the goal of pecuniary
gain. This more self-serving objective constitutes only a minor facet of
media's function. The industry also has an equally compelling and essential duty to foster the democracy that sustains its very existence.
To this end, media must continually strive to enrich public discourse
and cultivate what Steven Brill, former owner of Court TV, calls the
"marketplace of ideas."'188 Creation of this utopian dialogue requires
an increased appreciation of the various perspectives and views of an
increasingly diverse constituency. As a consequence, multiplicity of
voice must become a paramount consideration in the industry's decisions to disseminate news and information.
Efforts to advance multiplicity must be holistic and multifaceted.
Programs designed to maximize the ownership of media sources by
those who will serve underrepresented groups constitutes one strategy. Media acquisition, however, is expensive and increasingly more
elusive. 89 Systemic oversight of media source ownership must, therefore, be supplemented by societal catalysts that heighten the industry's sensitivity to diverse viewpoints and perspectives. Accordingly,
scholars, consumers, and other critics of the industry must encourage,
if not demand, that media sources become more sensitive to diversity
and its relevance in public discourse.
Mr. Brill is quoted in Bernard Goldberg's best seller, Bias, as saying
that "when it comes to arrogance, power, and the lack of accountability, journalists are probably the only people on the planet who make
lawyers look good."' 190 While one might challenge Mr. Brill's generalization of journalists and lawyers, his tacit indictment of journalistic
decision making remains significantly probative. The public must diligently scrutinize media's responsiveness to the totality of its constitu188. See supra note 178 (noting Steven Brill's speech at the Washington and Lee University's
Ethics in Journalism Lecture Series October 3, 2003). Of course, Mr. Brill is not the only commentator to promote the "marketplace of ideas." Professor Krotoszynski and A. Richard M.
Blaiklock have thoroughly discussed the concept. See Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 20.
189. The recently promulgated change in the FCC rules governing media ownership signifies
the current, less-compelling approach to the promotion of governmental programs that foster
minority participation in broadcasting. In fact, recent history has shown a progressive termination of these programs. See Marcelino Ford-Livene, The DigitalDilemma: Ten Challenges Facing Minority-Owned New Media Ventures, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 577, 578 n.1 (1999) (noting that
the 1995 repealing of the FCC-backed Minority Tax Certificate Program and the deregulation of
media associated with the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 added to the growing
lack of diversity in media ownership). See also Allen S. Hammond IV, The Telecommunications
Act of 1996: Codifying the Digital Divide, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 179, 191 (1997) (opining that

Supreme Court decisions, such as Adarand,have undermined the FCC's efforts at correcting the
under-representation of minorities in media ownership).
190. BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES HOW THE MEDIA DISTORT THE
NEWS (2002).
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ency. Public vigilance, in tandem with prudent governmental
oversight, not only heightens media's sensitivity to diversity, but also
secures the industry's role as a guarantor of democracy.

